C. S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book, C. J. Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements for a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth and engaging in a distinctively pragmatic project. This book spells out the relationship between truth and inquiry; it articulates the consequences of a statement's being true. It shows that the existence of a distinct pragmatic enterprise has implications for the status of the pragmatic account of truth and for the way in which philosophy should be conducted. This new paperback includes a brand-new additional chapter, along with a new preface and revised bibliography.

Table of Contents

Introduction; 1. Pragmatism; 2. Inquiry: The Fixation of Belief; 3. Logic; 4. Objectivity, Bivalence, and Truth; 5. Ethics; Bibliography; Index