Table of Contents

Preface ix Acknowledgments xv Part I: Strong-Form and Weak-Form Judicial Review Chapter 1: Why Comparative Constitutional Law? 3 Chapter 2: Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 18 Chapter 3: The Possible Instability of Weak-Form Review and Its Implications 43 Part II: Legislative Responsibility for Enforcing the Constitution Chapter 4: Why and How to Evaluate Constitutional Performance 79 Chapter 5: Constitutional Decision Making Outside the Courts 111 Part III: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights Chapter 6: The State Action Doctrine and Social and Economic Rights 161 Chapter 7: Structures of Judicial Review, Horizontal Effect, and Social Welfare Rights 196 Chapter 8: Enforcing Social and Economic Rights 227 Table of Cases 265 Index 269

Promotional Information

Tushnet puts flesh on the bones of the claim that constitutionally guaranteed social rights, judicially enforced, are already a part of the jurisprudence of the United States and other countries of interest. He takes this argument some distance beyond where any other scholar has taken it, so far as I know, and he does so with considerable refinement. This book gives a full and strong manifestation of the style, intelligence, and learning that have earned Tushnet his eminence as a scholar of American constitutional law and comparative constitutionalism. -- Frank I. Michelman, Harvard Law School This is an important contribution to an important debate in the United States about the possibility and prospects for the courts to play a more modest role in politics and policy. Tushnet demonstrates that, by a nice twist, a more modest judicial role could lead to a more robust set of social rights. And his comparative cases show that this is not purely theoretical, but that it has worked out to some degree in other systems. -- Gordon Silverstein, University of California, Berkeley

About the Author

Mark Tushnet is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. His many books include "The New Constitutional Order" and "Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts" (both Princeton). He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Reviews

"In this study of various theoretical issues of concern to students of comparative constitutional law, Tushnet has done a remarkable job of analyszing and comparing existing forms of judicial review...Tushnet's impeccable research leads us through varied constitutional systems including, for example, Argentina, Canada, Great Britain, and Ireland. This is constitutional scholarship at its best."--R.J. Steamer, Choice "Tushnet explores two prominent questions that constitutional drafters must ask: What powers of judicial review should courts have? and What rights should be enumerated? ... Tushnet's ambitious agenda in Weak Courts, Strong Rights is equally important for political scientists and comparative legal scholars."--Theresa J. Squatrito, Comparative Political Studies "Mark Tushnet has written an important book, featuring mastery of pertinent comparative constitutional law literature and an incredible ideas-per-ink ratio... Any serious scholar of comparative constitutional law cannot afford to skip this book."--Ran Hirschl, Ottawa Law Review