Table of Contents

Table of Figures
Table of Tables
Preface
List of Abbreviations
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction
CHAPTER 2 - The ILLR in Theory and Practice
CHAPTER 3 - The United States Invents its Own ILLR, 1961-1962
CHAPTER 4 - The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s
CHAPTER 5 - Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bailout, 1983-1999
CHAPTER 6 - U.S. International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s
CHAPTER 7 - The United States as ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008-2009
CHAPTER 8 - Conclusions
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX

About the Author

Daniel McDowell is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. His work has been published in International Studies Quarterly, Review of International Organizations, and New Political Economy.

Reviews

"Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? is a compelling analysis of American international financial policy, and of its implications for the world economy. It will be of great interest to scholars and others concerned about the functioning and stability of today's globe-straddling financial markets."-Jeffry Frieden, Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, and author of Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy
"This is a terrific book that should be read by anyone with an interest in how the global monetary system really works. With meticulous research, Daniel McDowell offers clear and convincing insight into the central role played by the United States, alongside the International Monetary Fund, in the management of international financial crises."- Benjamin J. Cohen, Louis G. Lancaster Professor of International Political Economy, University of California at Santa
Barbara
"This book is MUST-READ for anyone interested in the political economy of international financial stabilization. The U.S. has a long history of bailing out other nations, sometimes in conjunction with the IMF and sometimes independently. Daniel McDowell surveys this history from a geopolitical perspective, arguing that the U.S. only steps in when its vital national interests are at stake and the IMF is too slow-moving and limited in its response. McDowell
builds a very strong case for this argument, with evidence drawn from primary source materials, official transcripts, and statistical analyses."- J. Lawrence Broz, Professor of Political Science,
University of California, San Diego
"The book offers novel insights into the unique role that the United States has played in stabilizing international financial crises, while also shedding light on the limitations of the IMF to act as an ILLR. McDowell's writing style is clear and easy to comprehend for both experts and nonexperts alike, and the book's rich case studies help provide useful context to key findings discovered in the statistical analyses." - Perspectives on Politics