Part I. Competition Policy: History, Objectives and the Law: 1. Introduction; 2. Brief history of competition policy; 3. Objectives of competition policy, and other public policies; 4. The main features of European competition law; 5. Exercises; Part II. Market Power and Welfare: Introduction: 6. Overview of the chapter; 7. Allocative efficiency; 8. Productive efficiency; 9. Dynamic efficiency; 10. Public policies and incentives to innovate; 11. Monopoly: will the market fix it all?; 12. Summary and policy conclusions; 13. Exercises; 14. Solutions of exercises; Part III. Market Definition and the Assessment of Market Power: 15. Introduction; 16. Market definition; 17. The assessment of market power; 18. Exercises; Part IV. Collusion and Horizontal Agreements: 19. Introduction; 20. Factors that facilitate collusion; 21. Advanced material; 22. Practice: what should be legal and what illegal?; 23. Joint-ventures and other horizontal agreements; 24. A case of parallel behaviour: wood pulp; 25. Exercises; Part V. Horizontal Mergers: 26. Introduction; 27. Unilateral effects; 28. Pro-collusive effects; 29. A more general model; 30. Merger remedies; 31. Merger policy in the European Union; 32. Case studies; 33. Exercises; Part VI. Vertical Restraints and Vertical Mergers: 34. What are vertical restraints?; 35. Intra-brand competition; 36. Inter-brand competition; 37. Anti-competitive effects: leverage and foreclosure; 38. Conclusions and policy implications; 39. Cases; 40. Exercises; Part VII. Predation, Monopolisation, and Other Abusive Practices: 41. Introduction; 42. Predatory pricing; 43. Non-price monopolisation practices; 44. Price discrimination; 45. US v. Microsoft; 46. Exercises; 47. Solutions of exercises; Part VIII. A Toolkit: Game Theory and Imperfect Competition Models: 48. Introduction; 49. Monopoly; 50. Oligopoly I: market competition in static games; 51. Oligopoly II: dynamic games; 52. Appendix.
'Motta brings together today's economic theory with important cases from both sides of the Atlantic. It will be a valuable resource for students and practitioners, and I look forward to using it in classes.' Joseph Farrell, University of California, Berkeley 'Massimo Motta has filled a major lacuna by providing a comprehensive treatment of the modern theory of antitrust/competition policy. He masterfully blends theory and E.U. cases to produce a treatise that works at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, serves as a valuable resource for working economists, and is readable to many non-economists. In addition, by offering his own judicious views on the state of competition policy, he encourages the reader to go beyond digesting current knowledge and to think critically. A course on U.S. antitrust economics could do no better than to assign this text while complementing it with a collection of U.S. cases.' Joseph Harrington, Johns Hopkins University 'This careful treatment of the economics of competition policy, from an expert who has himself made important contributions to the theory, should be an essential reference for anyone working in the field. It fills a real gap in the market, and should be useful to practitioners as well as both advanced undergraduate and graduate students.' Paul Klemperer, Oxford University 'In this innovative and thoughtful volume, Massimo Motta brings the new generation of game-theoretic I.O. models to bear on a wonderfully wide ranging set of important recent cases in competition policy. This book will be of great interest, and of lasting value, to students and practitioners alike.' John Sutton, London School of Economics 'The book presents a good mix of examples, simple and intuitive explanations and more demanding, formalised models as well as exercises with suggested solutions. The true value of this book lies in its level of detail'. European Competition Law Review