1. Introduction; 2. A theory of judicial extraterritoriality; 3. US domestic courts and transnational governance; 4. Extraterritoriality in the absence of agreement: international antitrust; 5. Extraterritoriality's limits and US bargaining over intellectual property protections; 6. US extraterritoriality and human rights: shaping a treaty regime from within; 7. The waning of US extraterritoriality?
This book is about the US politics and law of judicial extraterritoriality and how it influences international rule making and enforcement.
Tonya L. Putnam is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, New York. She is a lawyer with experience in international public law litigation, and a member of the California State Bar.
'Courts without Borders makes sense of puzzling patterns in US
courts' decisions to assert domestic law internationally. Tonya L.
Putnam shows that courts avoid doing so when it would undercut the
public policy purposes the law is intended to serve and when rights
at the core of American political identity are threatened. Her book
is a masterful and compelling account of the politics and
principles that support and restrain the long arm of American law
overseas.' Beth Simmons, Clarence Dillon Professor of International
Affairs, Harvard University, Massachusetts
'This is an important study of critical but understudied questions
- when, how, and why do US courts bring US law to bear on persons
and conduct outside US territory and how do these decisions affect
international outcomes? Putnam's book is lucid, compelling, and
extraordinarily well-grounded in empirical details. This is one of
the best books to appear on issues of transnational law and
governance in recent years.' Eric Voeten, Peter F. Krogh Associate
Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice, Georgetown University,
Washington DC
'For much of the post-World War II era, the United States has been
a frequent yet selective regulator of activities outside its
territory, and US federal courts are often on the front line in
deciding the extraterritorial reach of US law. At stake in these
jurisdiction battles is the ability to bring the regulatory power
of the United States to bear on transnational disputes in ways that
other states frequently dislike in both principle and practice.
Putnam proposes a general theory of domestic court behavior to
explain variation in extraterritorial enforcement of US law,
emphasizing how the strategic behavior of private actors is
important to mobilizing courts and in directing their activities.'
Law and Social Inquiry
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