Table of Contents

Preface
Chapter One: Truman, 1945-1952
Chapter Two: The Normalisation of Nuclear Testing
Chapter Three: Eisenhower, 1952-1958
Chapter Four: The Expansion and then Suspension of Nuclear Testing
Chapter Five: Kennedy, 1961-1963
Chapter Six: The Limitation of Nuclear Testing
Conclusion
Bibliography

About the Author

David M. Blades, PhD, is a researcher at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, Melbourne.

Joseph M. Siracusa is professor of human security and international diplomacy and deputy dean of global studies at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, Australia. Chicago-born and raised, he is the author and coauthor of many books, including Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy (with David G. Coleman); Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction; and A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics (with Richard Dean Burns).

Reviews

[The authors] effectively show the differing purposes of and attitudes toward testing that prevailed during the administrations of Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy. . . .Blades and Siracusa’s book is a useful guide to nuclear testing during a crucial period of the Cold War and the arms race.
*Journal of American History*

Nuclear weapons have not been used in war since the United States dropped atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Since that time, however, there have been over 1,900 nuclear tests. What was the purpose and consequences of nuclear testing on national and international security? In this engaging and deeply researched book, David Blades and Joseph Siracusa explore how nuclear testing influenced nuclear thinking in the United States. While recognizing the horror of these weapons and the dangerous effects of testing, the authors reveal how these tests had an enormous influence, not simply on how the weapons and their delivery systems were developed, but also on the strategies for their use. This is an important book, absolutely required reading for anyone interested in how testing affected our policies, strategies, and thinking about nuclear weapons.
*Francis J. Gavin, Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies, MIT*