Table of Contents

1. The idea of law-like law; 2. Argument in a legal system; 3. Practice of legality; 3.1. Instituted discourse; 3.2. Entrenched pursuit; 3.3. Self-conception; 4. Pursuit of the rule of law; 5. Aspiration and impulse; 5.1. Nomological legality; 5.2. Liberal commitment; 5.3. Failure of legality; 5.4. Dual impulse; 6. Deep duality - formal law; 6.1. Rawls' first view of law; 6.2. A contrary view; 6.3. Law-like formality: Weber; 6.4. Half-right views; 7. Deep duality - law's ideals; 7.1. A contrary view; 7.2. Law-like ideals: Dworkin; 7.3. Halves of a whole; 7.4. Rawls' second view of law; 8. Two perils for law; 8.1. Liberal law's fears; 8.2. Overcoming peril; 8.3. Deeper danger; 8.4. What follows; 9. Fear of free ideals; 9.1. Warring creeds; 9.2. Moral skepticism; 9.3. What's feared; 10. Fear of open form: 10.1. Unsure concepts; 10.2. Linguistic skepticism; 10.3. What's feared; 11. Modern liberal practice; 11.1. Practice's view of law; 11.2. Two views of disorder; 11.3. Implications of disorder; 12. Legality recapitulated.

Promotional Information

Shows that the diverse ways of reasoning and judging in our law arise from the same root: a commitment to liberal legality.

About the Author

Lewis D. Sargentich is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Massachusetts. He has taught jurisprudence and legal theory courses there for four decades, including seminars on subjects ranging from natural law to legal skepticism.