Acknowledgments ; Introduction ; Chapter 1. Classical Theories ; Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations ; David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation ; John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy ; Chapter 2. Federalism, Antifederalism, and Jacksonianism ; Max Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 ; Agrippa, To the People ; Alexander Hamilton, Contintentalist ; Thomas Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business ; Chapter 3. Classicism, Neoclassicism, and the Sherman Act ; Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics ; Arthur Twining Hadley, Economics: An Account of the Relations Between Private Property and Public Welfare ; Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference (of 1899) ; Chapter 4. Progressivism and the 1912 Election ; Theodore Roosevelt, The Trusts, the People, and the Square Deal ; William Howard Taft, We Must Get Back to Competition ; Woodrow Wilson, The Tariff and the Trusts ; Chapter 5. Imperfect, Monopolistic, and Workable Competition ; Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition ; Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition ; John Maurice Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition ; Chapter 6. The New Deal and the Institutionalists ; Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property ; Louis Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness ; Rexford Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts ; Thurman Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business ; Chapter 7. Antitrust After Populism ; Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement? ; Chapter 8. Ordoliberalism and the Freiburg School ; Franz Bohm, Walter Eucken & Hans Grossmann-Doerth, The Ordo Manifesto of 1936 ; Franz Bohm, Democracy and Economic Power ; Chapter 9. Competition and Innovation ; Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy ; Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention ; Chapter 10. Structuralism ; Joe Bain, Industrial Organization ; Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis ; The Neal Report (1967) ; Chapter 11. The Chicago School ; George Stigler, The Organization of Industry ; Aaron Director and Edward Levi, Law the Future: Trade Regulation ; Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox ; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis ; Chapter 12. Transactions Costs Economics and the Post-Chicago Movement ; Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications ; F.M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust: A Variety of Influences ; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique
Daniel A. Crane is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School, where he teaches contracts, antitrust, and legislation and regulation. He was formerly Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Visiting Professor at NYU and the University of Chicago, and a Fulbright Scholar at the Universidade Catolica Portuguesa in Lisbon, Portugal. Herbert Hovenkamp is the Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law at the University of Iowa. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and recipient of the Justice Department's John Sherman Award. He teaches antitrust, innovation and competition policy, torts, and American legal history.
The volume does represent an invaluable addition to the antitrust literature and a very useful reference for the whole antitrust community. * Nicola Giocoli, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT * Students of antitrust learn about defining cases and underlying economics but little of its history. This unique collection addresses this gap. Editors Crane and Hovenkamp provide informative introductions to 12 groups of readings from Colonial times through the Progressive Era and to structural, Chicago-school, and post-Chicago approaches. This publication could valuably supplement policy history courses and antitrust courses in law schools. Highly recommended. Students, upper-division undergraduate and up; faculty; antitrust practitioners. * CHOICE *