Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Dilemmas of Interaction
Chapter 2. Coordination, Conflict and Convention
Chapter 3. The Circumstances of Justice
Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Anarchy
Chapter 5. Playing Fair
Chapter 6. A Limited Leviathan
Chapter 7. The Foole, the Shepherd and the Knave
Chapter 8. Justice as Mutual Advantage?
Appendix 1. Formal Definition of Convention
Appendix 2. Computer Simulations of Inductive Learning in Games
Appendix 3. Folk Theorems for the Indefinitely Repeated Covenant Game
Appendix 4. Humean Conventions of the Repeated Sovereignty and Repeated Provider-Recipient Gamed
References
Index

About the Author

Peter P. Vanderschraaf is Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science at the University of Arizona. He works in philosophy and game theory. He has held visiting appointments at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Boston University, and the School of Social Sciences of the Institute for Advanced Study.

Reviews

"Vanderschraaf sets out to develop an account of justice-as-convention, which is a form of justice-as-mutual-advantage. He certainly achieves this: the book provides a coherent and admirable account of why it is that rational agents might find it in their interest to share resources in an egalitarian fashion ... [this] is an important and impressive contribution to the literature on justice." -- Lina Eriksson, Economics & Philosophy
"For twenty years, Peter Vanderschraaf has been writing important papers about conventions. His new book, Strategic Justice, synthesises this body of work and displays his ability to write both as a scholarly philosopher and as a rigorous game theorist." -- Robert Sugden, Revue des livres