Table of Contents

Introduction
1: Defining the Challenge: Preparation, Not (Only) Plans
2: A Strategic Approach
3: Historical Context: (1) The Great Stream of Time
4: Historical Context: (2) Patterns for Anticipation
5: Political Process and Defence Planning
6: Guidance for Defence Planning
7: Between Prudence and Paranoia
Appendix
Bibliography
Index

About the Author

Dr Colin S. Gray is a political scientist with broad interests in national security policy, defence policy, strategy, strategic theory, and military history. He was educated at the University of Manchester (B.A. [Econ.] hons.), 1965, and at Lincoln College, Oxford University (D.Phil., International Politics, 1970). He is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies, and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, at the University of Reading,
England, and is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, VA, USA. From 1982 until 1987 Dr Gray held a Presidential appointment when he served on the President's General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. In April 1987 he was presented with the Superior Public Service Award by the US Department of the Navy. In 1997-98 he served on the Panel of Experts on the UK Strategic Defence Review. In 2009-10 he was a member of the Defence Advisory Forum for the UK Ministry of Defence.

Reviews

This volume -- the last of a trilogy -- is intended for defence professionals, and it should be required reading for the members of that audience.
*Ben Lombardi, Political Studies Review*

The book provides a brilliantly insightful picture of how the MOD works, a complex system where the interplay between military officers, politicians and civil servants demands constant consultation and adjustment in the search for consensus ... this book should be read and digested widely.
*Wing Commander Mal Craghill, RAF Centre for Air Power Studies Reading List*

an admirable addition to the theory of strategy
*Major Nathan K. Finney, Parameters*

This is an important book, because it raises questions about many of the assumptions and processes on which western defence planning is based.
*General H.R. McMaster, War, Conflict and the Military*

Strategy specialist Colin Gray delivers an excellent discussion illustrating how history, politics and military means all intertwine during defense planning in his work Strategy a& Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty. One of the works true strengths is the constant reference to other strategic contributors. Clausewitz and Thucydide's foundational works, On War and The History of Peloponnesian War are constantly referenced. In addition, Schelling's texts, The strategy of Conflict and Arms and Influence play a central role supporting overall concepts.
*Lt Col Mark T. Peters, USAF*