Table of Contents

Foreword Robert Auman; Acknowledgment; 1. Introduction; Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings; 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings; 4. Strategic questions; Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns; 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences; Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers; 8. The assignment game; 9. The generalization of the assignment model; Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions; Bibliography; Indexes.

Promotional Information

This book provides a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching.

Reviews

"This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets...The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature." From the Foreword by Robert Aumann "An expertly guided tour through an unfamiliar and beautiful region of equilibrium theory would be quite enough incentive for most economic theorists to buy and read this book. But perhaps the greatest treat offred is Roth's discovery of a happy coincidence between theory and practical affairs." Journal of Economic Literature