Preface ; Introduction: A Word on War and Strategy ; 1. Conceiving Strategy for the Cold War Era ; 2. From Advice to Support to War ; 3. The Myth of Attrition in Vietnam ; 4. On Bewildering Battlefields: Implementing Westmoreland's Strategy ; 5. The Parallel War ; 6. Training an Uncertain Army ; Conclusion: When Strategy May Not Matter
Gregory Daddis is Colonel and Professor of History, United States Military Academy.
Westmoreland's War...both rehabilitates Westmoreland's image and plants a stake in the heart of the distorted specter of him that has long haunted Vietnam War historiography. ... Backed by copious endnotes, Daddis demonstrates that contrary to legend Westmoreland developed an intelligent and comprehensive military strategy that was consistent with U.S. national policy and President Lyndon B. Johnson's larger political agenda. ... By demonstrating that the Army did try (not always successfully) to apply counterinsurgency doctrine and that this doctrine was insufficient to produce victory, Westmoreland's War directly challenges the unrealistic faith that some people have placed in counterinsurgency and nation building. * Army History Magazine *