Promotional Information

This book offers a unique perspective for understanding how and why the Second World War in Europe ended as it did—and why Germany, in attacking the Soviet Union, came far closer to winning the war than is often perceived.

Table of Contents

Maps
Tables
Series Foreword
Preface
Key to Military Symbols
Part I
1. The German War Machine on the Eve of War: Myth versus Reality
2. The Third Reich Ascendant: The Reasons Why
Part II
3. Comparing the World's First Military Superpowers on the Eve of War
4. History's Bloodiest Conflict Begins
5. An Inconvenient Decision Confronts Germany's Masters of War
6. Another Roll of the Dice
7. Stalingrad in Context
8. The European War's Periphery
9. Seizing the Initiative: The Sword versus the Shield
Part III
10. A New Perspective for Explaining D-Day's Outcome
11. Hitler's Greatest Defeat
12. How the Third Reich Staved Off Total Defeat during the Summer of 1944
13. End Game
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index

About the Author

Steven D. Mercatante is the founder and editor-in-chief of The Globe at War, a website focused on exploring World War II.

Reviews

This is an intriguing book that will surely be of great interest to students of World War II. It offers a fresh analysis of why Germany was beaten and poses reasons why it should have won.
*World War ll History*

Offers a fresh perspective on key events like the D-Day landings . . . Mercatante's scholarship is undoubtedly on solid ground, which makes this book a welcome addition to Second World War bibliography.
*Military History Monthly*

Mercatante (independent scholar) challenges conventional wisdom about Allied success in Europe through an impressive operational overview of Operation Barbarossa and various battles on the Eastern Front, D-Day, and the final drive into Germany. . . . Recommended.
*Choice*

A thought-provoking book. . . . Mercatante's main purpose is to counter widespread arguments that brute force was the main reason for success in World War II. . . . The Germans, he argues, repeatedly demonstrated that qualitative advantages could be more important than quantitative superiority in men and materiel, and that the Allied armies eventually won because they became better at mobile and combined arms warfare than their enemies. . . . [Mercatante's] case deserves to be heard.
*World War II Magazine*

Even those familiar with World War II scholarship will find here analyses of economic and technological matters that historians have often glossed over or mentioned only in passing. . . .There is . . . much sound analysis scattered through this book.
*Michigan War Studies Review*