Table of Contents

Illustrations; Maps; Preface; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Setting the Stage; Part I: The Home Front; The Search for a Manpower Policy; The Challenge of Labor; Controlling Shipping and Food; Part II: Strategy and the War; The First Attempt at a Unified Command; Facing the Submarine Menace; Prelude to Catastrophe; The Horror of Passchendaele; The Peripheral War; The Quest for a Negotiated Peace; The Creation of the Supreme War Council; The Plans for 1918; Before the Storm; Crisis on the Western Front; The Maurice Affair; The Origins of Intervention in Russia; The German Advance Halted; The Turn of the Tide; The Road to the Armistice; Conclusion; Bibliography

Promotional Information

Refutes the traditional view that Lloyd George was the person most responsible for winning the Great War.

About the Author

George H. Cassar is Professor of Military and Modern European History at Eastern Michigan University and a leading authority on Britain at war.

Reviews

'Cassar's views cannot be lightly set aside. [...] His case against Lloyd George is well made [...] Measured and reasonable [...] A fine scholarly study, founded on deep research and knowledge [...] It is of more than just historical interest [...] At a time when the UK's strategy, or lack of it, is receiving considerable attention, Cassar's careful study of how and why things went wrong is worth more than a passing glance.' -Gary Sheffield, 'The RUSI Journal'