1. On the origins of Western democracy; 2. Team production, organization, and governance; 3. Organizational governance in the long run; 4. The origins of territorial governance; 5. Constitutional exchange and divided governance; 6. The power of the purse and constitutional reform; 7. Suffrage without democracy; 8. Ideology, interest groups, and adult suffrage; 9. Setting the stage: philosophical, economic and political developments prior to the nineteenth century; 10. Liberalism and reform in the transformative century; 11. Fine-grained constitutional bargaining; 12. An overview of British constitutional history: the English king and the medieval parliament; 13. Constitutional exchange in England: from the Glorious Revolution to universal suffrage; 14. The Swedish transition to democracy; 15. Constitutional reform in the Netherlands: from republic to kingdom, to parliamentary democracy; 16. Germany: constitutional exchange in an emerging state during the nineteenth century; 17. The Japanese transition to democracy and back; 18. The United States, an exception or further illustration?; 19. Quantitative evidence of gradual reform; 20. Ideas, interests, and constitutional reform; Appendix: methodological approach, limits, and extensions.
This book explains why contemporary liberal democracies are based on historical templates rather than revolutionary reforms.
Roger D. Congleton is Professor of Economics and Senior Research Associate, Center for Study of Public Choice, at George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, where he has taught since 1988. His research focuses on the political economy of constitutions and public policy. Professor Congleton's most recent books include 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking (two edited volumes, 2008), which surveys the theoretical and applied literatures on rent seeking; Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy (2006), which surveys the empirical literature on the effects of democratic constitutional design on public policies and economic growth; Improving Democracy through Constitutional Reform (2003), which analyzes the effects of constitutional reform on policies and economic developments within Sweden during the past two centuries; and Politics by Principle Not Interest (Cambridge University Press, 1998, written with Nobel prize winner James Buchanan), which analyzes how a generality rule can improve the performance of democratic governments. In addition to his books, Professor Congleton has published more than 100 papers in academic journals and edited volumes on such topics as the politics of constitutional reform, the importance of information in democratic decision making, the emergence and significance of norms, and analyzed policy-making within national governments and international organizations.
'If we know how we got here, we know more about how to proceed.
This book is a comprehensive effort to help us understand the
evolution of the political institutions of Western democracies. The
analysis is generalized across several countries with separate but
comparable histories. Emphasis is on peaceful processes of
institutional development as opposed to romanticized revolutionary
change. An exemplary exercise in explanatory social science.' James
M. Buchanan, Nobel Laureate in Economics, 1986, George Mason
University
'It is rare to find an economist who is a serious student of
political history. Roger Congleton's new book is a powerful
contribution to historical institutionalism.' Iain McLean, FBA,
Oxford University
'Roger Congleton has written a masterful account of the evolution
of parliamentary democracy in the West. The book is filled with
insightful discussions of the transition to democracy in different
countries. It should be of interest for all students of democracy.'
Dennis C. Mueller, University of Vienna, Austria
'Roger Congleton has spent years perfecting his knowledge of
democratic governance - an extraordinary effort of great value for
scholars, students, politicians, and citizens.' Elinor Ostrom,
Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2009, Indiana University
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