Table of Contents

List of maps; Acknowledgements; List of abbreviations; Foreword; Preface. A test case of collective security; Introduction. The nature of the problem; Part I. Background of the Munich Crisis: 1. The shaky foundations of collective security: Moscow, Paris, London; 2. Soviet-Romanian relations I: 1934–8; 3. Soviet-Romanian relations II: Summer 1938; Part II. Foreground: Climax of the Crisis: 4. East awaiting West; 5. The Red Army mobilises; 6. Denouement; Part III. Conclusion: 7. What the Red Army actually did; 8. What the Red Army might feasibly have done; 9. Epilogue; 10. Assessment of Soviet intentions; Appendix 1. Pertinent paragraphs of the League of Nations Covenant; Appendix 2. Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak pacts: excerpts; Selected source materials and literature; Index.

Promotional Information

The findings in this book contribute to a considerable shift in the conventional wisdom on the subject of the Munich crisis.

Reviews

"...indispensable reading." American Historical Review "This is a thoroughly researched, persuasively argued work that materially advances our knowledge of the origins of World War II. It contributes not only to the study of Soviet foreign policy but to the understanding of Romanian diplomacy as well. Furthermore, it develops these central themes in the context of German, British, French, Romanian, Czech, Polish, and Hungarian policy. This is the way international history should be written." Teddy J. Uldricks, Slavic Review "Hugh Ragsdale's work has the advantage of expanding research to include the Eastern European scenario, thanks in particular to documentation from Romania." Journal of Modern History Silvio Pons, Universita degli studi di Roma, Tor Vergata