Table of Contents

Introduction 1. The Sociopolitical Background 2. Burgfrieden and Law of Siege Part One: The Old Regime and the Dilemmas of Total War 1. The Production, Manpower, and Social Policies of the Prussian War Ministry, 1914-1916 2. The Army and the Internal Crisis, 1914-1916: Image and Reality Part Two: Total Mobilization and Interest-Group Politics 3. Hindenburg Program and War Office: The Triumph of Heavy Industry 4. The Auxiliary Service Bill and the Triumph of Labour Part Three: The War Office Under the Leadership of General Groener 5. The War Office and the Problems of Production and Organization, December 1916 - August 1917 6. The War Office and the Social Problem (1): The Failure of the Auxiliary Service Law and the First Major Strikes 7. The War Office and the Social Problem (2): The Great Crisis and the Dismissal of Groener, May - August 1917 Part Four: The Failure of the Army 8. The Ludendorff "Dictatorship," August 1917 - February 1918 9. Germany in the Concluding Months of the War: The Defeat and the Search for a Scapegoat Epilogue Appendix Bibliographical Note Published Sources Index

Promotional Information

This innovative study by one of the leading specialists in the field examines the social and economic role of the German army in the nation's internal affairs during World War I.

About the Author

Gerald Feldman is Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.