1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.
Constructing International Security identifies effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships.
Brett V. Benson is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Asian Studies at Vanderbilt University. His research concentrates on alliances, deterrence, nuclear disarmament and international arms sales. He also studies Chinese politics and East Asia relations. His articles have been published in the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Peace Research, Security Studies and the Journal of East Asian Studies.
'In making alliance commitments to friendly but threatened states,
how do states balance the need to credibly deter a potential
aggressor while at the same time avoiding the moral hazard of
encouraging risky behavior by the ally? When will a state opt for
an ambiguous alliance commitment, and how does this strategic
ambiguity affect the behaviors of the ally and the threatening
state? Benson answers these questions by developing and testing a
new theory of alliances and probabilistic commitment. Constructing
International Security's substantive importance, theoretical rigor,
and empirical sophistication make it required reading for all
conflict theorists.' Jack S. Levy, Rutgers University
'Moral hazard in military alliances has been neglected by scholars
for the most part. Benson's book is the definitive study to date of
the problem of moral hazard in alliances. It is a major
contribution that should be read by anyone interested in alliances
and those more generally engaged with international security.'
James Morrow, University of Michigan
'In Constructing International Security, Brett V. Benson summons
strong evidence and convincing logic to uncover important
relationships between the content of alliance agreements and
incentives for war. This research substantially advances our
understanding of the effect of moral hazard on alliance behavior
and its links to military conflict. Scholars and policy makers
alike will find important insights throughout the pages of this
book.' Kristopher W. Ramsay, Princeton University
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