Promotional Information

This volume documents the events leading up to, during, and after the defeat of the 1967 guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia. General Prado evaluates the insurgency's geographical setting, guerrilla preparations, and the Bolivian response. He identifies key errors, including Che Guevara's failure to capture peasant support and anayzes Che's own theories.

Table of Contents

Illustrations
Foreword by Lawrence H. Hall
Preface
Background
The International Climate
The Domestic Scene
The Military Environment
The Operations Zone
General Description
Other Characteristics of the Region
The Operations
Preparations
Ñancahuazú and Iripití
A Force Divided
Moving North
No Way Out
La Higuera
The End
Evaluation
Some Clarifications
Assessment
Appendix: Impressions and Conversations
Selected English Readings
Index

About the Author

GARY PRADO SALMON is a recently retired General in the Bolivian Army. He has spent two decades accumulating materials and preparing charts in his efforts to reconstruct accurately the events of 1967--an important part of contemporary Bolivian history.

JOHN DEREDITA is a critic and translator. He has taught Latin American literature at Bryn Mawr College, Columbia University, and other institutions.

LAWRENCE H. HALL is a retired U.S. Army officer who taught in the Department of Foreign Languages at the United States Military Academy. He took a doctorate in Latin American history from New York University and has been teaching in that field at Connecticut College.

Reviews

?Captain Gary Prado Salmon commanded the unit that captured Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. Prado also grew up in Vallegrande where Guevara established his base. His reflective, intelligent, insightful, and candid book will stand as an authoritative, if unofficial, account of the sad demise of the most flamboyant Latin American guerrilla fighter of the 20th century. Based on the field diaries of Guevara as well as on Bolivian military sources, Prado's book dispassionately discusses the difficult local geography, the local and international climate at the time, and the entire operations of both sides on virtually a daily basis. Prado evaluates the strategies and errors of both the guerrillas and the Bolivian army, and he clarifies the confusion surrounding the death of Guevara. The Bolivian guerilla campaign suffered from poor planning, limited resources, and a pathetic ignorance of local geography, politics, and history. Adequately translated and readable, this book is enhanced with maps and photographs. All levels.?-Choice

"Captain Gary Prado Salmon commanded the unit that captured Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. Prado also grew up in Vallegrande where Guevara established his base. His reflective, intelligent, insightful, and candid book will stand as an authoritative, if unofficial, account of the sad demise of the most flamboyant Latin American guerrilla fighter of the 20th century. Based on the field diaries of Guevara as well as on Bolivian military sources, Prado's book dispassionately discusses the difficult local geography, the local and international climate at the time, and the entire operations of both sides on virtually a daily basis. Prado evaluates the strategies and errors of both the guerrillas and the Bolivian army, and he clarifies the confusion surrounding the death of Guevara. The Bolivian guerilla campaign suffered from poor planning, limited resources, and a pathetic ignorance of local geography, politics, and history. Adequately translated and readable, this book is enhanced with maps and photographs. All levels."-Choice