Table of Contents

Part I. Theory and Concepts: 1. Organized rebellion and its intractable problem; 2. A theory of rebel fragmentation; Part II. Rebellion in Ethiopia and Eritrea: 3. The Eritrean Liberation Front: 'Jebha' in action, 1960–1982; 4. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front: 'Shaebia' in action, 1972–1991; 5. The second wave of rebellion: Tigrayans, Oromos, Afars, and Somalis, 1975–2008; Part III. Rebel Fragmentation in the Broader Horn: 6. The long war in Somalia: the Somali National Movement, Islamic Courts Union, and Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahidin, 1981–2013; 7. Concluding thoughts.

Promotional Information

This extended treatment of insurgent fragmentation provides an innovative new theory tested through analysis of the Horn of Africa's civil wars.

About the Author

Michael Woldemariam is an Assistant Professor of international relations at Boston University's Pardee School of Global Studies. His research focuses on the dynamics of armed conflict, the behavior of rebel organizations, and post-conflict institution building. He has special expertise on the Horn of Africa region, where he has travelled extensively. His research has been published in Terrorism and Political Violence, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, and is forthcoming in a number of edited volumes, and he has been a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Bradley Foundation, the Truman National Security Project, and a research specialist with the Innovations for Successful Societies program at Princeton University.

Reviews

'Woldemariam pinpoints the importance of dynamics within insurgent groups and develops an original argument that explains how losses and gains in territorial control foment rebel fragmentation. His counter-intuitive conclusion, that rebel unity is strongest during times of prolonged stalemate, has important policy implications for those looking to encourage conflict resolution.' Terrence Lyons, George Mason University, Washington, DC

'Why do rebel organizations fragment and why does it matter? Drawing on a new database of fragmentation in 171 rebel organizations in sub-Saharan Africa (1946–2006), Woldemariam argues that fortunes on the battlefield hold the key to understanding these dynamics. When rebels lose territory, commitment problems push them apart. But even when they win, the reduced threat encourages fragmentation by weakening their incentives for continued cooperation. Ironically, therefore, rebel organizations are more likely to cohere during stalemates on the battlefield.' Paul D. Williams, George Washington University, Washington, DC

'This fascinating book reaches striking and original conclusions about the dynamics of African rebel groups, with a particular concern for the Horn, but with much broader applications.' Christopher Clapham, Centre of African Studies, University of Cambridge

'Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa combines a path-breaking theoretical analysis of the fragmentation of rebel movements with a deep and detailed historical study of cases from the Horn of Africa to provide a fascinating account of a much-neglected topic. This is an essential contribution to the literature on the dynamics of civil wars.' Alex de Waal, Tufts University, Massachusetts

'Theoretically sound and empirically robust, this book is a definitive work on rebel fragmentation in the Horn of Africa. In a region where scholarship has long been tainted by partisan politics, Dr Woldemariam presents a rare dispassionate analysis of the internal dynamics of insurgent groups in one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world.' Assefaw Bariagaber, Seton Hall University, New Jersey

'Michael Woldemariam's book offers a new and important explanation of rebel cohesion and fragmentation. By focusing on the impact of battlefield dynamics on rebel unity, Woldemariam helps us understand why insurgent cohesion is so challenging and prone to breakdown. His careful, deeply researched comparative evidence from Ethiopia and Somalia valuably brings these fascinating cases into dialogue with the broader literature on political violence. This book deserves wide attention and engagement.' Paul Stanliland, University of Chicago