About the Author

Brian VanDeMark is Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Academy. He served as research assistant to Clark M. Clifford in the preparation of his forthcoming memoirs.

Reviews

"A fascinating examination of presidential decision-making at the outset of the Vietnam War....A fine and convincing revisionist analysis."--Kirkus Reviews
"Contribute[s] significantly to understanding how Johnson failed in Vietnam....VanDeMark does an excellent job of correlating Johnson's preoccupation with his Great Society with his escalation decisions."--American Historical Review
"A detailed and compelling story....Provides significant and thoughtful lessons for today."--Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute)
"Brian Van De Mark provides a carefully documented and well-written account of the pressures encountered by President Johnson when he made the fateful escalation decisions from the end of 1964 to the summer of 1965. Van De Mark effectively demonstrates how and why Johnson was influenced during these early stages of the conflict."--Perspectives on Political Science

"A fascinating examination of presidential decision-making at the outset of the Vietnam War....A fine and convincing revisionist analysis."--Kirkus Reviews "Contribute[s] significantly to understanding how Johnson failed in Vietnam....VanDeMark does an excellent job of correlating Johnson's preoccupation with his Great Society with his escalation decisions."--American Historical Review "A detailed and compelling story....Provides significant and thoughtful lessons for today."--Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute) "Brian Van De Mark provides a carefully documented and well-written account of the pressures encountered by President Johnson when he made the fateful escalation decisions from the end of 1964 to the summer of 1965. Van De Mark effectively demonstrates how and why Johnson was influenced during these early stages of the conflict."--Perspectives on Political Science