The subject of this book, game-theoretic reasoning, pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences.
Preface
Each chapter ends with notes.
1. Introduction
1.1. What is Game Theory?
1.1.1. An Outline of the History of Game Theory
1.1.2. John von Neumann
1.2. The Theory of Rational Choice
1.3. Coming Attractions: Interacting Decision-Makers
I. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
2. Nash Equilibrium: Theory
2.1. Strategic Games
2.2. Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma
2.3. Example: Bach or Stravinsky?
2.4. Example: Matching Pennies
2.5. Example: The Stag Hunt
2.6. Nash Equilibrium
2.6.1. John F. Nash, Jr.
2.6.2. Studying Nash Equilibrium Experimentally
2.7. Examples of Nash Equilibrium
2.7.1. Experimental Evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma
2.7.2. Focal Points
2.8. Best Response Functions
2.9. Dominated Actions
2.10. Equilibrium in a Single Population: Symmetric Games and
Symmetric Equilibria
3. Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations
3.1. Cournot's Model of Oligopoly
3.2. Bertrand's Model of Oligopoly
3.2.1. Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: Some Historical Notes
3.3. Electoral Competition
3.4. The War of Attrition
3.5. Auctions
3.5.1. Auctions from Babylonia to eBay
3.6. Accident Law
4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Some Evidence on Expected Payoff Functions
4.2. Strategic Games in Which Players May Randomize
4.3. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
4.4. Dominated Actions
4.5. Pure Equilibria When Randomization is Allowed
4.6. Illustration: Expert Diagnosis
4.7. Equilibrium in a Single Population
4.8. Illustration: Reporting a Crime
4.8.1. Reporting a Crime: Social Psychology and Game Theory
4.9. The Formation of Players' Beliefs
4.10. Extension: Finding All Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria
4.11. Extension: Games in Which Each Player Has a Continuum of
Actions
4.12. Appendix: Representing Preferences by Expected Payoffs
5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory
5.1. Extensive Games with Perfect Information
5.2. Strategies and Outcomes
5.3. Nash Equilibrium
5.4. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
5.5. Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite Horizon Games:
Backward Induction
5.5.1. Ticktacktoe, Chess, and Related Games
6. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations
6.1. The Ultimatum Game, the Holdup Game, and Agenda Control
6.1.1. Experiments on the Ultimatum Game
6.2. Stackelberg's Model of Duopoly
6.3. Buying Votes
6.4. A Race
7. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and
Discussion
7.1. Allowing for Simultaneous Moves
7.1.1. More Experimental Evidence on Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium
7.2. Illustration: Entry into a Monopolized Industry
7.3. Illustration: Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters
7.4. Illustration: Committee Decision-Making
7.5. Illustration: Exit from a Declining Industry
7.6. Allowing for Exogenous Uncertainty
7.7. Discussion: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward
Induction
7.7.1. Experimental Evidence on the Centipede Game
8. Coalitional Games and the Core
8.1. Coalitional Games
8.2. The Core
8.3. Illustration: Ownership and the Distribution of Wealth
8.4. Illustration: Exchanging Homogeneous Horses
8.5. Illustration: Exchanging Heterogeneous Houses
8.6. Illustration: Voting
8.7. Illustration: Matching
8.7.1. Matching Doctors with Hospitals
8.8. Discussion: Other Solution Concepts
II. GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
9.1. Motivational Examples
9.2. General Definitions
9.3. Two Examples Concerning Information
9.4. Illustration: Cournot's Duopoly Game with Imperfect
Information
9.5. Illustration: Providing a Public Good
9.6. Illustration: Auctions
9.6.1. Auctions of the Radio Spectrum
9.7. Illustration: Juries
9.8. Appendix: Auctions with an Arbitrary Distribution of
Valuations
10. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
10.1. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
10.2. Strategies
10.3. Nash Equilibrium
10.4. Beliefs and Sequential Equilibrium
10.5. Signaling Games.
10.6. Illustration: Conspicuous Expenditure as a Signal of
Quality
10.7. Illustration: Education as a Signal Of Ability
10.8. Illustration: Strategic Information Transmission
10.9. Illustration: Agenda Control with Imperfect Information
III. VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS
11. Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization
11.1. Maxminimization
11.2. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium
11.3. Strictly Competitive Games
11.4. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive
Games
11.4.1. Maxminimization: Some History
11.4.2. Empirical Tests: Experiments, Tennis, and Soccer
12. Rationalizability
12.1. Rationalizability
12.2. Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions
12.3. Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions
12.4. Dominance Solvability
13. Evolutionary Equilibrium
13.1. Monomorphic Pure Strategy Equilibrium
13.1.1. Evolutionary Game Theory: Some History
13.2. Mixed Strategies and Polymorphic Equilibrium
13.3. Asymmetric Contests
13.3.1. Side-blotched lizards
13.3.2. Explaining the Outcomes of Contests in Nature
13.4. Variation on a Theme: Sibling Behavior
13.5. Variation on a Theme: The Nesting Behavior of Wasps
13.6. Variation on a Theme: The Evolution of the Sex Ratio
14. Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma
14.1. The Main Idea
14.2. Preferences
14.3. Repeated Games
14.4. Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.5. Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.6. Strategies in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.7. Some Nash Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma
14.8. Nash Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma
14.8.1. Experimental Evidence
14.9. Subgame Perfect Equilibria and the One-Deviation Property
14.9.1. Axelrod's Tournaments
14.10. Some Subgame Perfect Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma
14.10.1. Reciprocal Altruism Among Sticklebacks
14.11. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14.11.1. Medieval Trade Fairs
14.12. Concluding Remarks
15. Repeated Games: General Results
15.1. Nash Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated Games
15.2. Subgame Perfect Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated
Games
15.3. Finitely Repeated Games
15.4. Variation on a Theme: Imperfect Observability
16. Bargaining
16.1. Bargaining as an Extensive Game
16.2. Illustration: Trade in a Market
16.3. Nash's Axiomatic Model
16.4. Relation Between Strategic and Axiomatic Models
17. Appendix: Mathematics
17.1. Numbers
17.2. Sets
17.3. Functions
17.4. Profiles
17.5. Sequences
17.6. Probability
17.7. Proofs
"This is a textbook to be enjoyed both by professors and students,
full of clever and often original applications and examples.
Serious students who use this text are likely to emerge with a new
way of thinking about much of what they see in the real
world."--Ted Bergstrom, Professor of Economics, University of
California, Santa Barbara
"The book is just superb. I anticipate (based both on my own
reading of the book, and comments from colleagues at other
institutions) that this will be the standard text for introductory
courses in game theory in political science departments for the
foreseeable future."--Scott Gehlbach, Assistant Professor of
Political Science, University of Wisconsin
"What distinguishes this book from other texts is its remarkable
combination of rigor and accessibility. The central concepts of
game theory are presented with the mathematical precision suitable
for a graduate course, but with an abundance of wide-ranging
examples that will give undergraduate students a concrete
understanding of what the concepts mean and how they may be
used."--Charles A. Wilson, Professor of Economics, New York
University
"A great book, by far the best out there in the market in
thoroughness and structure."--Dorothea Herreiner, Assistant
Professor of Economics, Bowdoin College
"The ideal textbook for applied game theory . . . . It teaches
basic game theory from the ground up, using just enough clearly
defined technical terminology and ranging from traditional basics
to the most modern tools."--Randy Calvert, Professor of Political
Science, Washington University in St. Louis
"The approach is intuitive, yet rigorous. Key concepts are
explained through a series of examples to guide students through
analysis. The examples are then followed by interesting and
challenging questions. The main strength is the impressive set of
exercises . . . they are extremely well organized and incredibly
broad, ranging from easy questions to those for adventurous
students."--In-Koo Cho, William Kinkead Distinguished Professor of
Economics, University of Illinois
"The gentle pace of the material along with the plethora of
examples drawn from economics (mainly) and political science seems
to work very well with students."-Branislav L. Slantchev,Assistant
Professor of Political Science, University of California, San
Diego
"The book is excellent. It is chock full of exercises that are both
interesting and applicable to real issues, allowing me great
flexibility in focusing on specific examples to illustrate the
theory."--Christopher Proulx, Assistant Professor of Economics,
University of California, Santa Barbara
"This book provides a simple yet precise introduction into game
theory, suitable for the undergraduate level. Author Martin J.
Osborne makes use of a wide variety of examples from social and
behavioral sciences to convey game-theoretic reasoning. Readers can
expect to gain a thorough understanding without any previous
knowledge of economics, political science, or any other social or
behavioral science. No mathematics is assumed beyond that of basic
high school."--Journal of Macroeconomics
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