Table of Contents

Preface; 1. Introduction to the Shapley value Alvin E. Roth; Part I. Ancestral Papers: 2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley; 3. A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik; Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations: 4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth; 5. The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D. Straffin, Jr.; 6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet; 7. Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber; 8. Combinatorial representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs Uriel G. Rothblum; 9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell; 10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen; Part III. Coalitions: 11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz; 12. Endogenous formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Part IV. Large Games: 13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R. Zame; 14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep Dubley and Abraham Neyman; 15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman; 16. Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens; Part V. Cost Allocation and Fair Division: 17. Individual contribution and just compensation H. P. Young; 18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair Tauman; Part VI. NTU Games: 19. Utility comparison and the theory of games Lloyd S. Shapley; 20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler, Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.

Promotional Information

This volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper.