Table of Contents

Table of Contents Preface Abbreviations Introduction Chapter One: Eisenhower and the Atomic Age (1945-1952) Chapter Two: The Dawn of the Thermonuclear Age (1953) Chapter Three: The BRAVO Shot and Rise of the Test-Ban Debate within the International and Scientific Communities (1954-1955) Chapter Four: Fallout from the BRAVO Shot: The Test-Ban Debate within the Eisenhower Administration (1954-1955) Chapter Five: The Election of 1956: A Moratorium on Candor Chapter Six: The Influence of Strauss, the Fall of Stassen, and the Rise of Sputnik (November 1956 - October 1957) Chapter Seven: PSAC, the Test Moratorium, and the Geneva System (October 1957 - August 1958) Chapter Eight: Hard Decisions after HARDTACK II: Stalemate at Geneva (August 1958 - December 1959) Chapter Nine: The Threshold Ban, the Paris Summit, and the Farewell Address (December 1959 - January 1961) Epilogue Conclusion Notes Sources Index

About the Author

Benjamin Greene is Assistant Professor of History at Bowling Green State University in Ohio.

Reviews

"Greene offers an intriguing argument to explain why the president failed [to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty with the USSR]. His book is carefully crafted, it is methodologically sound, and it makes a genuine contribution to scholarship on the politics of science and technology in the cold war. Greene's conclusions, however, are bound to be controversial because of what they say not only about science advice but about Eisenhower's control over his own administration." - Technology and Culture "Greene's thoroughly researched and well-written book promotes a clear thesis: The scientists who advised Eisenhower played the 'pivotal role' in shaping his attitudes about the test ban and thus shaped the test-ban debate." - Journal of American History "This is a very valuable study, based on an exhaustive survey of the sources that have become available in the past four decades of what may, or may not, have been an important missed opportunity for a total ban on nuclear testing before 1961." - Parameters "Greene demonstrates thoroughly, in so doing superseding previous scholarship, that Eisenhower personally wanted a test ban." - Journal of Military History "Benjamin P. Greene's monograph is an exemplary study of the interaction of geopolitics, bureaucratic maneuvering, and scientific claims during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. The careful research and important arguments of Greene's monograph make it essential reading for historians interested in the Cold War, arms control, nuclear decision making, and the history of science policy." - American Historical Review