Part I. The Logic of Nuclear Skepticism: 1. Nuclear blackmail in international politics; 2. Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism; Part II. Trends: 3. Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining; 4. Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics; Part III. Cases: 5. Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails; 6. Think again: reassessing nuclear victories; Part IV. Conclusions: 7. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality.
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.
Todd S. Sechser is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, where he is an expert on international security issues. Matthew Fuhrmann is Associate Professor of Political Science and Ray A. Rothrock '77 Fellow at Texas A & M University.
'This fascinating book is, I believe intentionally, more
provocative than merely persuasive, more skeptical than most among
us are. It looks at the history of international negotiation, both
explicit and by maneuver, in the presence of nuclear weapons and
concludes that disparities in nuclear armaments - including zero on
one side - make much less difference than they are given credit
for. If the argument doesn't persuade you, the forty case studies
of nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining (eleven involving the
United States) will make you think it over.' Thomas C. Schelling,
Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences
'Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann make a compelling case that,
during the Cold War, nuclear weapons played a critically important
role in deterring a nuclear attack on the US; but, importantly,
they argue that this was the only role they played. They did not
deter the many other security crises we had to deal with, including
the Berlin crisis, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. And they
argue that this historical fact has great significance to today's
security issues. This book is an important read, not only for its
clear articulation of history, but for its relevance to planning
nuclear forces or nuclear policy today.' William J. Perry, former
United States Secretary of Defense
'This is the most important study on nuclear compellence since
Richard Betts published his landmark book in 1987. In fact, Sechser
and Fuhrmann have likely written the definitive study on why
nuclear compellence has not worked and cannot work.' Robert J. Art,
Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations, Brandeis
University,Massachusetts
'Scholars and policymakers have long debated whether obtaining
nuclear weapons would allow powerful states to bully or blackmail
weaker adversaries, but previous efforts to address this question
have lacked both strong logical foundations and systematic
empirical evidence. In this rigorous and clearly written study,
Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann explain why nuclear
superiority confers far less leverage than hardliners typically
believe. It is a model of policy-relevant social science that
deserves a wide audience.' Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer
Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University,
Massachusetts
'How do nuclear weapons shape international politics? Does the
possession of nuclear weapons provide states with coercive
advantages during a crisis? Many scholars and policy makers assume
that they do. In their well-researched, crisply argued book, Todd
S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann rely on both historical and
quantitative approaches to develop their theory of nuclear
skepticism. Nuclear weapons, they argue, remain powerful tools for
deterrence but contribute little to successful coercive diplomacy.
This is an important book: Sechser and Fuhrmann's arguments have
potentially significant consequences for both our understanding of
nuclear dynamics and the practice of nuclear statecraft, and
deserve great attention and debate.' Francis J. Gavin, Frank
Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
'A solid and thorough deconstruction and reconstruction of theories
about the utility of nuclear threats. Required reading for anyone
interested in nuclear diplomacy.' Bruce M. Russett, Dean Acheson
Professor of Political Science, Yale University, Connecticut
'Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy is well organized and
accessible … reads with great relevance to the current
international environment.' Catherine Greene, International Studies
Review
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