Table of Contents

1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Social choice; 16. Bargaining games; 17. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 18. The core; 19. The Shapley value; 20. The bargaining set; 21. The nucleolus; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices.

Promotional Information

This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.

About the Author

Michael Maschler was a Professor at the Einstein Institute of Mathematics and the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He greatly contributed to cooperative game theory and to repeated games with incomplete information. Eilon Solan is a Professor of Mathematics at Tel Aviv University. He currently serves as the Director of the Beno Arbel program for gifted young students, and as the Academic Director of the Israeli team to the IMO. Shmuel Zamir is a Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a founding member of the Center for Study of Rationality, and is the editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT).

Reviews

Praise for first edition: 'This is the book for which the world has been waiting for decades: a definitive, comprehensive account of the mathematical theory of games, by three of the world's biggest experts on the subject. Rigorous yet eminently readable, deep yet comprehensible, replete with a large variety of important real-world applications, it will remain the standard reference in game theory for a very long time.' Robert Aumann, Nobel Laureate in Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Praise for first edition: 'Without any sacrifice on the depth or the clarity of the exposition, this book is amazing in its breadth of coverage of the important ideas of game theory. It covers classical game theory, including utility theory, equilibrium refinements and belief hierarchies; classical cooperative game theory, including the core, Shapley value, bargaining set and nucleolus; major applications, including social choice, auctions, matching and mechanism design; and the relevant mathematics of linear programming and fixed point theory. The comprehensive coverage combined with the depth and clarity of exposition makes it an ideal book not only to learn game theory from, but also to have on the shelves of working game theorists.' Ehud Kalai, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Praise for first edition: 'The best and the most comprehensive textbook for advanced courses in game theory.' David Schmeidler, Ohio State University and Tel Aviv University

Praise for first edition: 'There are quite a few good textbooks on game theory now, but for rigor and breadth this one stands out.' Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University, Massachusetts

Praise for first edition: 'This textbook provides an exceptionally clear and comprehensive introduction to both cooperative and noncooperative game theory. It deftly combines a rigorous exposition of the key mathematical results with a wealth of illuminating examples drawn from a wide range of subjects. It is a tour de force.' Peyton Young, University of Oxford

Praise for first edition: 'This is a wonderful introduction to game theory, written in a way that allows it to serve both as a text for a course and as a reference … The book is written by leading figures in the field [whose] broad view of the field suffuses the material.' Joe Halpern, Cornell University, New York