Preface.
Part I: Philosophical Problems In Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots:.
1. The Early Growth Of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System.
Aristotle, Galen And Nemesius: The Origins Of The Ventricular Doctrine.
Fernel And Descartes: The Demise Of The Ventricular Doctrine.
The Cortical Doctrine Of Willis And Its Aftermath.
The Conception Of A Reflex: Bell, Magendie And Marshall Hall.
Localizing Function In The Cortex: Broca, Fritz And Hitzig.
The Integrative Action Of The Nervous System: Sherrington.
2. The Cortex And The Mind In The Work Of Sherrington And His Proteges.
Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact.
Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism.
John Eccles And The ‘Liaison Brain’.
Wilder Penfield And The ‘Highest Brain Mechanism’.
3. The Mereological Fallacy And Its Manifestation In Contemporary Neuroscientific Thought.
Mereological Confusions In Cognitive Neuroscience: (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird).
Methodological Qualms: (Ullman, P.S. Churchland, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner Squire And Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry).
On The Grounds For Ascribing Psychological Predicates To A Being: (Crick, Baars).
On The Grounds For Misascribing Psychological Predicates To An Inner Entity: (Damasio, Edelman And Tononi, Kosslyn And Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick).
The Inner: (Damasio).
Introspection: (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz).
Privileged Access: Direct And Indirect: (Blakemore).
Privacy Or Subjectivity: (Searle).
The Meaning Of Psychological Predicates And How They Are Learnt: (Searle).
Of The Mind And Its Nature: (Gazzaniga, Doty).
Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: an Analysis:.
Preliminaries.
Brain-Body Dualism: (Kandel Schwartz And Jessell, Libet).
The Project: (Gazzaniga).
The Category Of The Psychological: (Nagel, P.M. Churchland And P.S. Churchland).
4. Sensation and Perception.
Sensation: (Searle, Libet, Geldard And Sherrick).
Perception: (Ledoux, Crick).
Perception As The Causation Of Sensations: Primary And Secondary Qualities: (Kandel Schwartz And Jessell, Rock).
Perception As Hypothesis Formation: Helmholtz: (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young).
M. R. Bennett AO is Professor of Physiology and University
Chair at the University of Sydney. He is the author of many papers
and books in neuroscience, including The Idea of Consciousness
(1997) and A History of the Synapse (2001). He is President of the
International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, Past President of
the Australian Neuroscience Society, and the recipient of numerous
awards for his research in neuroscience, including the Neuroscience
Medal, the Ramaciotti Medal and the Macfarlane Burnet Medal.
P. M. S. Hacker is a Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford. He is the author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications is the monumental five-volume Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and its epilogue Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (first two volumes co-authored with G. P. Baker).
“This remarkable book, the product of a collaboration between a
philosopher and neuroscientist, shows that the claims made on
behalf of cognitive science are ill-founded. The book will
certainly arouse opposition... but if it causes controversy, it is
controversy that is long overdue.” Sir Anthony Kenny, President of
the British Academy, 1989–93
“This book was simply waiting to be written.” Denis Noble, Oxford
University
“Contemporary scientists and philosophers may not like Bennett and
Hacker's conclusions, but they will hardly be able to ignore them.
The work is a formidable achievement.” John Cottingham, Professor
of Philosophy, Reading University
“Neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers will be challenged
– and educated – by this sustained and well-informed critique.”
Paul Harris, Professor, Human Development and Psychology, Graduate
School of Education, Harvard University
"This book is a joy to read. It is the fruit of collaboration
across disciplines and continents between a neurophysiologist and a
philosopher. They have written a polemical work that is a model of
clarity and directness. Distiniguished neurophysiologist M.R.
Bennett of the University of Sydney, and eminent Oxford philosopher
P.M.S. Hacker have produced that rarity of scholarship, a genuinely
interdisciplinary work that succeeds. ... This is a wonderful book
that will illuminate, provoke and delight professional scientists,
philosophers and general readers alike." Australian Book Review
"Bennett and Hacker have identified [conceptual confusions] with
clinical precision and relentless good sense.... rich with
philosophical insights ... thoughtful and wonderfully useful
treatise ..." Philosophy
"careful application in a host of cases ...is precisely what
Bennett and Hacker provide in devastating critiques of
psychologists and neuroscientists such as Blakemore, Crick,
Damasio, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Penrose and
Weiskrantz; and they also raise equally disturbing questions for
philosophers such as Dennett, the Churchlands, Chalmers, Nagel and
Searle. Whether this book leads to a reconfiguring of contemporary
neuroscience and the philosophy associated with it will tell us
much about the dynamics of contemporary intellectual life."
Philosophy
"The vast spectrum of material in philosophy and neuroscience that
Bennett and Hacker consider is impressive and their discussion is
thorough and illuminating." Human Nature Review
1. ‘[It] will certainly, for a long time to come, be the most
important contribution to the mind-body problem which there is.’ G.
H. von Wright
2. ‘everyone who thinks about the mind and consciousness should
study Philosophical Foundations of Neurtoscience. ... it will
ultimately contribute to a far better understanding of mind and
consciousness within scientific thought as well as a better
understanding of the limits of empirical investigation’, Arthur
Collins, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004
3. ‘Sweeping, argumentative and brilliant, this book will provoke
widespread discussion among philosophers and neuroscientists
alike’, Dennis Patterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 2003
4. ‘...devastating critiques of psychologists and neuroscientists
... Whether this book leads to a reconfiguring of contemporary
neuroscience and the philosophy associated with it will tell us
much about the dynamics of contemporary intellectual life’, Anthony
O’Hear, Philosophy 2003
5. ‘This book is a joy to read. ... a model of clarity and
directedness... [Bennett and Hacker] have produced that rarity of
scholarship, a genuinely interdisciplinary work that succeeds. ...
This is a wonderful book that will illuminate, provoke and delight
professional scientists, philosophers and general readers alike.’,
Damian Grace, Australian Book Review, 2003
6. ‘clinical precision and ... relentless good sense ... [a]
thoughtful and wonderfully useful treatise’, Daniel N. Robinson,
Philosophical Quarterly, 2004
7. ‘mandatory reading for anybody interested in neuroscience and
consciousness research. The vast spectrum of material in philosophy
and neuroscience that Bennett and Hacker consider is impressive and
their discussion is thorough and illuminating.’ Axel Kohler, Human
Nature Review, 2003
8. ‘a delicious cake of a book in which Bennett and Hacker guide
the reader through a conceptual minefield of confusions repeatedly
made by neuroscientists and philosophers alike.’ Constantine
Sandis, Metapsychology 2003
9. ‘Anyone who has ever framed a theory or explained one should
read this book ‑ at the risk of forever falling silent.’, The
Rector, University of Sydney, Obiter Dicta 2003
10. ‘... impressively lucid ... Bennett and Hacker unquestionably
succeed in making us challenge our own concepts, examine them for
dross, and strive to home in on fundamentals.’ Neil Spurway,
Journal of the European Soc for Study of Science and Theology.
11. ‘...the fruit of a unique cooperation between a neuroscientist
and a philosopher ... an excellent book that should be read by all
philosophers of cognition and all researchers in the cognitive
neurosciences.’ Herman Philipse, ABG #2, De Academische Boekengids
2003
12. `...there are, I think, grounds for hope that this book will do
an enormous amount of good, both in correcting philosophical
confusion within neuroscience and in promoting a new style of
dialogue between neuroscience and philosophy' David Cockburn,
Philosophical Investigations, 2005
Im Wesentlichen dokumentiert das Buch die Möglichkeit Wittgensteins
Spätphilosophie kritisch auf die konzeptionellen Prämissen der
Neurowissenschaften anzuwenden. Ein Fokus liegt dabei auf der
Mereologie. Die Mereologie ist eine noch relativ junge
philosophische Disziplin an der Grenze zwischen Logik und
Philosophie. Sie untersucht in systematischer Weise auf der
Grundlage geeigneter logischer Systeme die Beziehungen zwischen
Teil (griech. meros) und Ganzem. Von besonderem philosophischem
Interesse ist die Frage, inwieweit sich mereologische Strukturen
zur Klärung und Lösung verschiedenster Probleme vor allem der
Ontologie und Erkenntnistheorie einsetzen lassen. Hackers
Dartellung ist dabei ein besonders gelungener Versuch, diese Frage
zu beantworten. Einigen (!) Neurowissenschaftlern unterläuft
nämlich der sprachlogische Fehler Attribute auf das Gehirn
anzuwenden, die nur dem Menschen als Ganzem zugeschrieben werden
können. Es ist demnach also nicht möglich eine neue Grammatik
einzuführen, die es erlauben würde zu postulieren, das es das
menschliche Gehirn ist, welches "denkt", "konzeptioniert" oder
"konstruiert". Solche Fähigkeiten können nur dem Menschen als
Ganzem zugeschrieben werden. Dieser Grundgedanke zieht sich durch
das ganze Buch. Sicherlich ist der Umfang des Buches nicht an allen
Stellen gerechtfertigt. Die Ursache hierfür ist aber weniger bei
Hacker zu suchen, als vielmehr an der Vielzahl der
Neurowissenschaftler mit denen der Autor sich beschäftigt.
Insgesamt ein gelungenes Werk, das zur Pflichtlektüre eines jeden
gehören sollte, der sich mit der Philosophie des Geistes aus einer
sprachkritischen Perspektive beschäftigen möchte. (Amazon.de, Juli
2010)
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