Table of Contents

The Arab-Israeli Conflict Escalates, 1957-1963: A Turning Point in the Arab States' Attitudes Towards the Palestinian Problem; Formulation of Arab Strategy in the Isaeli-Arab Conflict, 1964-1965: Prelude to the Six Day War; Failure of the Arab Plan for Diverting the River Jordan's Tributaries; The Rise of the Palestinians as a factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict; The Fida'iyyun Organisations' Contribution to the Descent to the Six Day War; The Arab Military Build-Up; Nasir's Steps Toward the Six Day War: 13 May to 5 June 5 1967; In the Wake of the Six Day War; Conclusion: The Arab-Israeli Conflict between the Nakba and the Naksa --The Emergence of the New Palestinian National Movement.

About the Author

Professor Moshe Shemesh teaches Middle Eastern studies at Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva, and is a Senior research associate at the Ben-Gurion Research Institute, Sede Boker, Israel. His publications include books and articles on the ArabIsraeli conflict and the Palestinian national movement.

Reviews

"A valuable contribution to the understanding of Arab politics in the decade before the Six-Day War. Well-referenced and injecting new Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian documents into the narrative, Shemesh's book challenges historians' conventional wisdom... a necessary addition to any serious library or scholar's bookshelf." --Middle East Quarterly

"Primarily utilizing Arab primary sources, Shemesh reconstructs the history of the decade preceding the Six Day War between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. His reliance on previously unexamined Arab sources leads him to a number of novel conclusions, the most important of which include the notion that the Sinai War (of October 1956) had exacerbated rather than alleviated Arab-Israeli tensions and the Palestinian problem, that Nasir of Egypt was rational in his preparations for the conflict and that responsibility for the military fiasco is primarily attributable to Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, that Egyptian commitment to Palestinian self-determination was strong and not an opportunistic fig leaf, that the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was a major trigger for the conflict, that the defeat of Arab forces in the war prompted the Arab states to decisively turn towards political processes in order to resolve the conflict, and that the Israeli seizure of the West Bank served to strengthen the political regime of Jordan." --Reference & Research Book News