Table of Contents

1: Introduction
PART I. Games with Perfect Monitoring
2: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring
3: The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring
4: How Long Is Forever?
5: Variations on the Game
6: Applications
PART II. Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring
7: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
8: Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs
9: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring
10: Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
11: Applications
PART III. Games with Private Monitoring
12: Private Monitoring
13: Almost Public Monitoring Games
14: Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games
PART IV. Reputations
15: Reputations with Short-Lived Players
16: Reputations with Long-Lived Players
17: Finitely Repeated Games
18: Modeling Reputations

About the Author

George J. Mailath (Ph. D., Princeton University) is the Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. Larry Samuelson (Ph. D., University of Illinois) is the Antoine Augustin Cournot Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin.

Reviews

"Repeated Games and Reputations is a much-needed addition to the ranks of advanced game theory books. It has features that will appeal to both economic theorists and applied economists in various fields. In addition to being a useful reference book, it would make a great textbook for a second field course in game theory and would be a useful supplementary reference in many microeconomic theory, macroeconomic theory and industrial organization field
courses."--The Economic Record
"Repeated Games is comprehensive, self-contained, and extremely clear, with proofs that not infrequently improve on the originals. The book is an ideal text for part or all of a second graduate class in game theory, and will be a valuable aid for any student of the field."--Drew Fudenberg, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
"George Mailath and Larry Samuelson have written a landmark book in game theory, which takes stock of decades of research on repeated games and dynamic games more generally. The book not only provides an insightful synthesis of the extensive literatures relating to folk theorems, reputation, and play under a variety of information and monitoring structures; but perhaps more importantly it provides some original proofs that shed new light on some of the central
results in these areas. This book will be an invaluable resource for researchers in the area, and should also quickly become a standard reading for advanced graduate students."--Matthew O. Jackson,
Edie and Lew Wasserman Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology
"The study of repeated games has been one of the most fruitful and important developments in economic theory in the last thirty years. In this beautifully lucid book, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson--two leading researchers in the field--lay out the classic results in detail and also bring the reader up to date with the latest findings."--Eric S. Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study
"The theory of reputations in repeated games has become one of the most important areas of research in economic theory, because it offers essential insights into the foundations of economic and political institutions. The past decade has seen great progress in this area, especially in the study of games with imperfect private monitoring. George Mailath and Larry Samuelson have been active leaders in this research, and here they systematically lay out the state
of the art. This book will be an important text and reference for years to come."--Roger Myerson, University of Chicago
"Theorists use repeated games to understand self-enforcing contracts, and to explore the power of reputation formation in strategic settings. The centrality of these ideas explains why, despite the technical challenges involved, the literature on repeated games has grown rapidly in recent years. With their masterful treatment of many of the most important parts of this vast territory, Mailath and Samuelson have done a great service to both students and
researchers."--David G. Pearce, Department of Economics, New York University