"The mind has no special properties that are not exhausted by its representational properties, along with or in combination with the functional organization of its components. It would follow that once representation itself is (eventually) understood, then not only consciousness in our present sense but subjectivity, qualia, 'what it's like,' and every other aspect of the mental will be explicable in terms of representation together with the underlying functionally organized neurophysiology... I do not think there will be any 'problem of consciousness' left." William Lycan
William G. Lycan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
"The mind has no special properties that are not exhausted by its representational properties, along with or in combination with the functional organization of its components. It would follow that once representation itself is (eventually) understood, then not only consciousness in our present sense but subjectivity, qualia, what it's like,' and every other aspect of the mental will be explicable in terms of representation together with the underlying functionally organized neurophysiology... I do not think there will be any problem of consciousness' left." William Lycan
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