Part I. A Theory of Speech Acts: 1. Methods and scope; 2. Expressions, meaning and speech acts; 3. The structure of illocutionary acts; 4. Reference as a speech act; 5. Predication; Part II. Some Applications of the Theory: 6. Three fallacies in contemporary philosophy; 7. Problems of reference; 8. Deriving 'ought' from 'is'; Index.
This outstandingly clear and lively 1969 book provokes its readers to rethink issues they may have regarded as long since settled.
'This small but tightly packed volume is easily the most
substantial discussion of speech acts since John Austin's How to do
things with words and one of the most important contributions to
the philosophy of language in recent decades.' The Philosophical
Quarterly
'This book has immediately, and justly, been accorded the status of
a major contribution to the philosophy of language. The brilliant
but programmatic insights of Austin's How to do things with words
are systematically developed and integrated with the more recent
work of philosophers such as Grice, Rawls and Searle himself to
produce an apparently comprehensive and certainly illuminating
general theory, summarized in what Searle terms the 'main
hypothesis' of the book, 'speaking a language is engaging in a
rule-governed form of behaviour.' Mind
'The main merit of Searle's book - and it is a very substantial
merit indeed - is that by attempting to construct a systematic
theory of speech acts it substantially advances out knowledge of
the problems that have to be solved in this fascinating field. Even
if Searle himself has not yet found a wholly satisfactory way
through the jungle, he has certainly established a number of
clearings which will greatly facilitate subsequent explorations.'
Philosophical Review
'Written in an outstanding clear and lively style, it provokes its
readers to rethink issues they may have regarded as long since
settled.' The Times Literary Supplement
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