Table of Contents

Preface 1. Principles of Rational Decision Two Paradigms of Rational Decision Expected Utility The Theory of Games Integrating the Two Paradigms 2. Dynamic Deliberation: Equilibria Deliberational Dynamics and Game Theory Deliberational Equilibria Games Played by Bayesian Deliberators Equilibrium Selection The Bayes Dynamics Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Normal Form Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria Equilibria and Rationality 3. Dynamic Deliberation: Stability Dynamic Stability of Equilibria Imprecise Priors and Elicitation through Deliberation Structural Stability I Structural Stability II Stability and Rationality 4. The Value of Knowledge Good Thinking Probable Knowledge Ramsey's Anticipation Dynamic Probability and Generalized Learning Generalized Learning Generalized Generalized Causal Decision Theory Deliberational Equilibrium Reconsidered M Is for Martingale 5. Dynamic Coherence Pumping Gold Coherent Expectations Utility Prevision and Measure Coherent Preferences and Upper and Lower Probabilities Dynamic Coherence Bayes' Rule Bayes' Method Probability Kinematics Black-Box Learning and Higher-Order Probabilities Rules and Reference Coherence and Deliberation 6. Good Habits On the Rational Stability of Good Habits Finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Beyond Common Knowledge of Rationality Choosing Good Habits Just Habits The Social Contract Revisited Taking Turns Good Habits and Game Theory 7. Prospects for a Theory of Rational Deliberation Consistency Proofs Causal Independence and Rationalizability Nash Equilibrium Reconsidered Dynamics Fictitious Play by Carnapians More Sophisticated Deliberators The Tracing Procedure Toward a Theory of Dynamic Deliberation Appendix. Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer Notes References Index

About the Author

Brian Skyrms is Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine.

Reviews

An important book… With its unprecedentedly broad and clear surveys, unified by Skyrms’s original contributions, it will be read and discussed by a good many practitioners and students of philosophy (and economics and political theory).
*Richard Jeffrey, Princeton University*