1. Overview
1. Introduction
2. Interpretive Framework
3. Preview
4. Current Work on Kant's 'I-Think'
Part I: Background
2. Locke's Internal Sense and Kant's Changing Views
1. Locke's Influence
2. Locke's Complex Theory of Internal Sense
3. Kant's Varied Reactions
4. 'Inner Sense' in relation to Kantian 'Apperception'
5. Kant's Use of 'Inner Sense'
3. Personal Identity and Its Problems
1. Locke's Problem
2. Leibniz's Criticisms and Additions
3. Kant and Hume
4. Tetens (and Hume)
4. Rationalist Metaphysics of Mind
1. The Role of Rationalism
2. Leibniz's Elegant 'I-theory'
3. Faculties, Powers and Substances
4. Rational Psychology
5. Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Cognition
1. Introduction
2. Locke's 'Reflection' and Leibniz's 'Apperception'
3. Self-consciousness and Object cognition
4. Self-Consciousness through Self-Feeling
5. Summary
6. Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachla?
1. Introduction
2. Kant's Objection to the Inaugural Dissertation
3. Principles of Appearance and Thought in the Duisburg NachlaB
Notion of Apperception?
4. What is the Duisburg Nachla?'s Notion of 'Apperception?
5. From the Duisburg NachlaB to the Critique
Part II: Theory
7. A Transcendental Deduction for A Priori Concepts
1. Kant's Goal
2. Clues to the Nature of the Argument
3. The First Premise of the Transcendental Deduction
4. Apriority and Activity
5. A 'Transcendental' Deduction
8. Synthesis: Why and How?
1. Problems to be Solved
2. Kant's Definition
3. Synthesis and Objective Reference
4. Five Syntheses and Their Relations
9. Arguing for Apperception
1. Introduction
2. 'I-Think' as the 'Cogito'; The One-step Deduction from
Judgment
3. What Kind of Cognition Is at Issue in the Transcendental
Deduction?
4. What is the Principle of Apperception?
5. The Apperceptive Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept
6.Combination and Self-Consciousness in the B Deduction
7. Arguing from the Unity of Apperception to the Necessary
Applicability of Categories to Intuitions
8. Transcendental Apperception, Empirical Apperception and
'Mineness'
9. Summary
10. The Power of Apperception
1. Introduction
2. What is the Power/Faculty of Apperception?
3. Does the Faculty of Apperception Endure? Is it the 'Inner
Principle' of a Substance?
4. Does the Power of Apperception Initiate Causal Chains or Provide
Impressions of Necessary Connection?
5. 'Is it an Experience That I think?'
6. Root Powers, Scientific Ideals and the Ground of Appearances
11. 'I-Think' as the Destroyer of Rational Psychology
1. Understanding Kant's Criticisms
2. Kant's Earlier and Later Treatments of Rational Psychology
3. 'I-Think' as the Vehicle of the Categories
4. 'I-Think' as Analytically Contained in the Concept of
Thought
5. Does the Analysis of Cognition Imply the Existence of a
Thinker?
6. Why Can't Thinkers Know Themselves as Such?
Part III: Evaluation
12. Is Kant's Theory Consistent?
1. The Old Objection
2. The Most Problematic Passage (A251-52)
3. The Confusion about the Causes of Sensations
4. A Second Look at the Most Problematic Passage
5. Criticizing Rationalist Confusions
6. What Kant's Epistemology and Metaphysics Imply
13. The Normativity Objection
1. Psychologism or Noumenalism?
2. Scrutinizing Sensations and Adding 'Transcendental Content'
3. Forming Concepts and Acquiring the I-Representation
4. Making A Priori Principles Explicit and Testing Instances
5. Normativity and the I-rule
Appendix to Chapter 13: Longuenesse on Concept Formation
14. Is Kant's Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?
1. Introduction
2. Texts Linking Theoretical and Practical Reason
3. Autonomy and Accountability
4. Intellectual Accountability
15. Kant our Contemporary
1. Supporting and Showing Relevance
2. Transcendental Arguments
3. Must Rational Cognition involve Self-consciousness?
4. A Second Hard Problem of Consciousness?
5. Other 'I's
Patricia Kitcher is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. She is the author of Kant's Transcendental Psychology.
"In [Kant's Thinker]'s pages we find a coherent, plausible, interpretation of the issues surrounding Kant's theory of the cognitive subject: cognition, synthesis, apperception, object-consciousness, the failure of rational psychology, whether thinking is an experience, etc. A significant achievement and a lasting contribution to the field." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
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