Table of Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction Part I. The Egyptian War Decision and Its Implementation 1. The War Decision 2. Planning the Next War: Past Experience and the Main Problems Problem I: The Crossing of the Canal Problem II: Egyptian Air Inferiority Problem III: Inferiority in Armored Fighting 3. The Egyptian Deception Plan i. The Role of Deception in Egyptian War Planning ii. Passive Deception iii. Active Deception iv. Assessment of the Egyptian Deception 4. The Egyptian-Syrian War Coordination Part II. Israel Prepares for War 5. The Balance of Forces--the Israeli View 6. The Intelligence Conception and Its Sources i. The Conception ii. The Empirical Evidence 7. The Strategic Warning and Its Role in Israel's War Plans 8. The Next War Scenarios 9. The War Estimate: October 1972--August 1973 i. October 1972--April 1973 ii. April--May 1973 iii. June--August 1973 Part III. The Dynamics of an Intelligence Fiasco 10. August--September 1973 11. Monday, October 1, 1973 12. Tuesday, October 2, 1973 13. Wednesday, October 3, 1973 14. Thursday, October 4, 1973 15. Friday, October 5, 1973 16. Saturday, October 6, 1973, 0400 --1400 17. Surprise i. The Cabinet ii. The Canal Front iii. The Golan Front iv. The Air Force 18. The Cost of Being Caught Unprepared i. The Material Losses ii. The Psychological Impact of Surprise 19. The Causes of the Intelligence Failure i. Obstacles Unique to the Warning-Response Process ii. Bureaucratic Obstacles iii. Groupthinking iv. Psychological Obstacles at the Individual Level v. The Human Factor Notes Bibliography Index

About the Author

Uri Bar-Joseph is Professor of International Relations at Haifa University. He is the author of Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain and The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948.