Table of Contents

List of acronyms

Glossary
Introduction
I. Argentina’s two pantheons: from mitrismo to revisionism
1. Mitrismo, Argentina’s “official” history
2. The Nueva Escuela and the Centenary Generation
3. Nacionalismo, populist nationalists and the emergence of historical revisionism

II. Between co-optation and opposition: Peronism, nationalism and the politics of history, 1946–55
1. Prelude to Perón: nacionalismo and the military, 1943–46
2. Intellectuals, nationalism and the Peronist state
3. Peronism and the pantheon of national heroes
4. The effects of Peronist nationalism

III. The deepening polarisation: the proscription of Peronism and its politics of history, 1955–66
1. Intellectuals and the rise of left-wing revisionism
2. The politics of history under the Liberating Revolution
3. Frondizi’s “integrationism” and the emergence of Peronist-nationalist youth groups

IV. The apogee of revisionism: nationalism, political violence and the politics of history, 1966–76
1. Nationalism and history in the Onganía regime
2. History narratives and the rise of middle-class student Peronism
3. The return of Peronism: revisionism’s victory?

V. New narratives for a new era? Shifts, decline and resurgence of nationalist constructions of the past since 1976
1. Nationalism and the proceso
2. The rise of irredentism and the decline of partisan nationalism
3. Nationalism and democratisation: laying revisionism to rest?
4. The accommodation and resurgence of revisionism under Menem and the Kirchners
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

About the Author

Michael Goebel is Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter (lecturer/assistant professor) of Global History at the Free University Berlin and John F. Kennedy Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

Reviews

An original and excellent piece of work. In November 2011 Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner created a new state-funded history institute: the "Instituto Nacional de Revisionismo Historico Argentino e Iberoamericano Manuel Dorrego," with the purpose of promoting the research and diffusion of a "national and popular" version of national history, a version associated to what is known as "revisionismo historico," historical revisionism. The fact that still in the twenty-first century a Peronist government understands that the state should promote the dissemination of what it considers to be the "true version of history," in opposition to the supposedly "falsified history" of the so-called "liberal historiography," thus reviving an 80 year old political debate, shows to what extent history in Argentina continues to be a political weapon. Michael Goebel's fine volume, well researched and argued, historicizes the Argentine "combats for history," rightly placing them at the convergence of political and intellectual history. In particular, his purpose is to analyze "the interaction between nationalism and the politics of history in twentieth-century Argentina" (p. 1). "Revisionismo historico" originated in the 1930s among right-wing nationalist intellectuals who wanted to dispute the Argentine liberal tradition and particularly what they considered to be the "liberal" version of the national past imposed by the elites that ruled the country in the second half of the nineteenth century. To put it simply, revisionism claimed (and still claims) the existence of two Argentinas: one cosmopolitan, liberal, philo-European and associated to the interests of foreign (particularly British) interests, located mostly in the city of Buenos Aires; another deeper Argentina of the caudillos and gauchos from the interior who represented the true essence of the nation and of the Argentine people. In practical terms, however, the chief achievement of revisionism consisted in replacing the official national pantheon composed by those who the nationalists considered to be traitors and sellouts to British imperialism with another pantheon largely composed by caudillos from the interior at the top of whom is Juan Manuel de Rosas, the dictator who ruled the province of Buenos Aires (and, de facto, the whole country) for over twenty years until he was defeated at the battle of Caseros in 1852. The social impact of revisionism has been based more on its ability to provide simple answers to complicated questions than on the quality of its products. Although the version of the past promoted by historical revisionism never became a truly "official history" (although some governments, like the current one have, however, incorporated some elements of it), throughout the decades, and particularly since the late 1960s, this version of history gradually became a kind of historical "common sense." Paradoxically, as Goebel points out, revisionists have claimed to be persecuted and marginalized while their version of history became widely popularized and accepted by large sectors of the population. It could be said that at least some elements of the revisionist version of history (particularly the idea of "two Argentinas") became internalized and, to some extent, naturalized not only by many Argentines but also by some foreign scholars working on Argentine nationalism and the formation of a national identity.[1] Goebel, however, makes clear that the idea of two Argentinas is a historical construction and not an essential quality of the Argentine nation. Where others see two clearly identifiable political traditions, Goebel sees a matrix of interpretation (p. 17). In this context, the author's nuanced book is a welcome contribution to the debate around Argentine nationalism(s) and the uses of the past. Throughout the five chapters of the volume Goebel ably follows the origins and later development of Argentine nationalism and historical revisionism during almost one century. He focuses on the multiple appropriations and internal tensions and contradictions of historical revisionism and its articulation with different versions (both right- and left-wing) of nationalism. Particularly successful is Goebel's analysis of the way in which the Peronists (especially the Peronist left) appropriated revisionism in the 1960s and 1970s turning what used to be a version of history attractive mostly to some right-wing nostalgics and philo-fascists into a broadly disseminated and accepted vision of the past as well as a political weapon for the present. Goebel rightly disputes those visions that see a simple line of continuity between the pro-fascist nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s and the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, he shows that although the dictators sometimes used some elements (ideas and individuals) from nationalism and revisionism, their murderous actions and policies recognized a much more complex set of sources of inspiration among which revisionism and nationalism were not the most important ones. In fact, it can be said that - as the author himself suggests -, neither revisionism nor nationalism have been the main elements that have defined the Argentines' identity. After 1945 most forms of identity collapsed into the dichotomy Peronist/anti-Peronist, and this lasted at least until the 1990s. Both Peronism and anti-Peronism agglutinated a series of different and many times completely incompatible elements. This otherwise excellent book has, nonetheless, a few weak points. First, there is a permanent displacement of its focus between broadly defined nationalism and the more specific historical revisionism, to the point that sometimes it is difficult to say what the main theme of the book is. Of course, there is a close relationship between nationalism and revisionism, but this relationship has sometimes become very complex, as Goebel shows. Second, I missed a deeper discussion of the relations between historical revisionism and academic-professional history. In the last decades there have been important debates within the field of professional history about the role of popular diffusers (closely associated to a revisionist version of history) and the canonical versions of the past. Very little of this is present in Goebel's volume. Third, although the author points out in the introduction that his approach is not comparative and that he focuses on a single case study, his broader theoretical concerns on "the nature of nationalism and the reasons for its endurance as a phenomenon shaping contemporary culture and politics" (p. 2) would have been better served by including some comparative discussion on the differences and similarities existing between the Argentine and other Latin American cases. Finally, there are a few minor factual mistakes sprinkled throughout the book: Popular historian Felix Luna would have hardly identified himself as a liberal as is said on page 198; Viedma is the capital of the province of Rio Negro, and therefore not located in the province of Buenos Aires (p. 199); and Leopoldo Lugones was never an anti-Semite as Goebel seems to suggest in page 37. If anything, Lugones was one of the few (if not the only one) philo-Semitic Argentine right-wingers. But these are really minor shortcomings of an important book that is destined to become mandatory reference for anyone interested in Argentina's political and intellectual history of the twentieth century. Note: [1] See, in particular, Nicolas Shumway, The Invention of Argentina, Berkeley 1991. ... an important book that is destined to become mandatory reference for anyone interested in Argentina's political and intellectual history of the twentieth century. Argentina's Partisan Past is an impressive book on a still vexed question: how to make sense of the political past of Argentina. Goebel cleverly begins this book by quoting Eric Hobsbawm's claim that 'Nations without a past are contradictions in terms' (p. 1). But paradoxically the understanding of national history and its implication in the political life of a country is not the focus of political scientists. Nonetheless there is a consensus among historians that the struggle to command the interpretation of history is a contest for the 'collective memory', and thereby an attempt to gain political dominance. As a result, 'historical memory' becomes an 'affair of state'. While dominant elites may try to downplay rivalries and strife between groups belonging to the same nationality, challenging oppositions can also mobilise nationalism against the holders of power. At this point, historical revisionism becomes revealing both for historians and political theorists, especially those who study Argentina. Indeed, few can deny that Argentina is one of those countries in which the impact of historical interpretation has been a permanent issue in its political life. However, as Goebel correctly notes, the debate on Argentine national history has been written almost exclusively by Argentine historians for an Argentine audience. Most studies have made little effort to link the history of revisionism to broader debates about nationalism. This book rightly aspires to correct this omission and attempts to shift the emphasis from discussions about the origins and the content of revisionism towards questions about its changing nature (p. 6). For that purpose the author stresses the interplay between the intellectual field and the realm of politics as the only way by which the dynamics of nationalism can be grasped (p.17). In a broader sense this book makes a great contribution in convincing scholars that Argentina's politics is not divided between clearly identifiable political traditions defined as 'liberals vs. nationalists'. As Goebel argues, instead of a clear-cut divide between an anti-liberal nationalism and an anti-nationalist liberalism we are dealing with different understandings of nationhood whose relationship has been conflictive but also shifting, complementary and mutually constitutive (p. 236). This is an important claim that cast doubts on those works that draw a connecting line between nationalism and Argentina's authoritarian legacy. Some of them, such as Nicolas Shumway's The Invention of Argentina (University of California Press, 1991), have stressed that it is precisely the legacy of Argentina's nationalism and its political culture which accounts for the country's political and economic decline. Other works, such as Carlos Waisman's Reversal of Development in Argentina (Princeton University Press, 1987), even claim that a new brand of authoritarian and economic nationalism shifted the path of Argentina's development from a liberal to a national corporatist one, which ultimately led to economic and political crisis. In more senses than one, Goebel's book attempts to surpass this dichotomy. Yet the central question is still open. How can we explain Argentina's democratic deficit? How to explain Argentina's confrontational rather than consensual democracy? Does the very process of historical revisionism and debate about its national identity play a role in paving the way for the absence of common rules of the game for all political actors? By way of comparison, in Uruguay, a society similar to Argentina in its social composition, we can see the violent confrontation of two political factions (Blancos and Colorados) for political power. However, their political projects were not mutually exclusive. That allowed a political arrangement based primarily on territorial distribution and then some sharing in government, which formed the basis of the Uruguayan democratic consensus. In Argentina, by contrast, two political factions espouse exclusivist versions of national organisation and compete against each other about rules and about the content of national identity. The two factions not only cling to different historical mythologies but also present two opposing views of national organisation projects. Liberals, socialists and conservatives, for example, can be considered the side that propounds the liberal model of modernisation. These latter defend the official version of the history of Argentina. Nationalists of both left and right argue for a model of corporatist-populist national organisation and base their demands on the revisionist version of Argentina's political history. From 1810 to 1852, Argentina was a country divided by the struggle between Federalists (traditionalists, caudillistas) and Unitarists (modernists). Before the final victory of the modernist Unitarians, Juan Manuel de Rosas governed Argentina between 1829 and 1852, with a brief interlude in the early 1830s. His rule and his legacy have provoked deep divisions in Argentine society, and much of the history written about him falls into the extremes of diatribe and vindication. With Rosas' defeat in 1930s, Argentina began a liberal process of modernisation, a process idealised in the works of intellectuals such as Bartolome Mitre, Bautista Alberdi and Domingo F. Sarmiento. According to them, Argentina was a 'barbarous', ignorant country, a product of Spanish colonialism, which had to be civilised by means of a new ideology of progress based on positivist philosophy. The important point, however, is that the model of national modernisation relied on the delegitimisation of Rosas' tyranny. That model endured until the early 1930s, the decade when historical revisionism was propounded by a new brand of nationalist intellectuals who, paradoxically, were influenced by opposing - although dialectically synthesising - ideas. On the one side stood fascist-influenced intellectuals who gathered around the journal La Nueva Republica, from where they attacked democracy and especially the rule of Hipolito Yrigoyen. On the other side stood populist intellectuals who originated precisely in the Radical Party led by Yrigoyen. Although the two sides differed in their intellectual ideological conceptions, under the Roca-Runciman Pact, which marked the association of British economic interests with Argentina's conservatives, these opposing sides found a common language against liberalism and economic and cultural imperialism. Indeed, the pact marked the beginning of an era defined as the 'infamous decade', which became the apogee of historical revisionism. During that era, both brands of nationalist claimed to be rescuing the 'real' Argentina from oblivion. Both argued that there had been a systematic distortion that had led to an 'official history' and which was the result of liberalism. Both defied British imperialism and supported Argentina's neutrality during the Second World War. According to some observers these two types of 'right-wing authoritarian' nationalism and left-wing populism set the ideological frame of Peronism. The question, however, is whether and how this ideological configuration reappeared at different times and at different periods of Argentina's political history. Is Peronism anti-imperialist and an advocate of historical revisionism? Are all liberals anti-Peronist and against historical revisionism? Goebel shows that history is richer than ideological configurations. Indeed, Goebel makes great efforts to show that historical revisionism has been adopted by various governments of different ideological persuasions. Peron would be a reasonable candidate to adopt historical revisionism, since he could be easily portrayed as a representative of Rosas' anti-imperialist populism. However, as Goebel correctly states, Peron sought to strike a careful balance between Rosas and liberal figures such as Sarmiento (p. 86). In a similar vein Goebel stresses that under Ongania's regime, which represented the opposite of Peronist social authoritarianism, revisionist essayists of left-wing leaning such as Rosa and Hernandez Arregui occupied temporary posts at the University of Buenos Aires in place of reformist academicians expelled by the regime after 'the night of the long sticks'. In more senses than one, historical revisionism and the figure of Rosas could be adopted by populists as well as by liberal authoritarians. The former cling to Rosas' anti-elitist and anti-imperialist cast, whilst the latter praise his authoritarian rule. As Goebel suggests, although nowadays we can say that nationalism is not as important as it was in the past, historical revisionism is still present for Peronists of the Right as well as of the Left. Indeed the myth of Rosismo was resuscitated by leftist Kirchnerismo as well by neoliberal Menemismo. These represent the right-wing and left-wing faces of Argentine nationalism: the populist and the authoritarian. However, we get a very different view from the dwindling camp of liberal democrats. During the period of transition to democracy after the end of military rule, the incumbent Raul Alfonsin described the figure of Rosas as incompatible with democratic values (p.203). This claim is important because it came from a representative of what could be labelled the new democratic 'political culture'. In other words, despite the fact that Rosas and historical revisionism appeal to all Argentines, they are definitively more appealing to nationalists from the Right and the Left. Should this distinction be a surprise for observers of Argentine politics? Not at all. The same issues raised by rightist and leftist nationalism in the past have been revived by the Kirchners, for whom Argentina's oligarchy is associated with imperialist interests and the world finance centres and is accordingly protected by the 'liberal' institutions of the country. In this sense the Kirchnerista discourse follows the same confrontational path originating with historical revisionism. Although Kirchnerismo governs a large majority, it portrays its elitist political adversaries not as a political opposition but as foes of the nation. In this sense, Kirchnerismo echoes its nationalist forerunners for whom the concept of 'anti-national forces' was usually equated with a liberal cosmopolitanism centred in the city of Buenos Aires (p. 17). It is arguable that the imaginary of two Argentinas propagated by revisionists - a liberal cosmopolitan port city as opposed to a traditional rural interior - is an invention. Indeed the boundaries between the two were always blurred and open to dispute. However, as Goebel correctly emphasises, the dichotomy would have failed to strike a chord had it not been recognisable in social reality through differences in economic activities, clothing, food and to some extent ethnicity. In this sense it is not wrong to note that the socio-political and cultural distance between the two Argentinas is as present now as before. Historical revisionism contributes to widening this gap even further. TA L B E R T O S P E K T O R OWS K I Argentina's Partisan Past is an impressive book on a still vexed question: how to make sense of the political past of Argentina. Michael Goebel's detailed study focuses on the "politics of history" in Argentina - on how the state, political actors, and intellectuals produced and used particular understandings of national identity. He specifically pays attention to two versions of Argentine history related to cultural and political struggles since the nineteenth century. The first, revisionism, is an oppositional nationalist account that appeared in the 1930s. Rooted in changes in the cultural field and the discipline of history in the early twentieth cen tury, revisionism was initially related to antiliberal and conservative sectors. It was later appropriated and resignified by left- leaning, Peronist, national liberation groups, and since 2003, by the administrations of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner. The second version, which revisionists called official or "liberal" history, originated in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was related to the emergence of Argentina's modern state and was adopted by anti- Peronist groups and administrations in the twentieth century. Goebel argues that disputes over the national past, linked to historical circumstances, both explain and reflect the remarkable internalization in Argentine society and politics of divisions between "the national" and "the foreign," associated respectively with "nationalist" and "liberal" political traditions. He joins an already large scholarship on revisionism and nationalism that has noticed the remarkable presence of historical debates in Argentine politics and how that dichotomy was expressed at different moments. Nevertheless, Goebel introduces several elements that result in an innovative approach. Theoretically, Goebel rejects the exclusive association of nationalism, understood as a broader discursive formation, with right- wing, antiliberal movements and ideas, which he distinguishes as nacionalismo. Moreover, he argues that the divide between "national" and "liberal- foreign" embedded in the different versions of national history is more "a matrix of interpretation" than a clear- cut division. These important theoretical distinctions allow a more nuanced perspective on his topic. First, Goebel incorporates the liberal version of history into the study of Argentine nationalism, which, as he notes, has been traditionally reduced to nacionalismo. Second, and based on an impressive mass of primary and secondary sources, he convincingly demonstrates the ambiguities of competing versions of history as appropriated by different political groups at different moments. For example, Goebel shows the influence of both right- wing nationalist and liberal ideas and traditions on the military dictatorship of 1976 - 83. Complementing the studies on revisionism by Alejandro Cattaruzza, Tulio Halperin Donghi, and Diana Quattrocchi- Woisson, he argues that while revisionist nationalism influenced a wide range of groups on the Right and the Left since the 1930s, it was never fully adopted, even during more favorable political circumstances with Peronism in power in 1946 - 55 and 1973 - 76. Analyzing the particular elements involved in the different versions of national history, he concludes that nationalism in Argentina cannot be reduced to either ethnocultural or civic elements but entails a mixture of both. While the book will primarily interest specialists in Argentine history, it offers valuable comparative perspectives. Goebel compares Argentine historical narratives and nationalism to other Latin American cases such as Mexico and Peru and to broader theoretical works on nationalism. His careful analysis of the role of intellectuals and historians in politics can be related to studies such as those by Nicola Miller and Jean Franco on Latin American intellectuals, Claudia Gilman on the connection of Latin American writers to revolutionary struggles, and Daryle Williams on Getulio Vargas's cultural policies in Brazil. Some aspects merit comment and need further clarification. Goebel argues that the professionalization of the historical discipline in the early twentieth century was linked to the emergence of an autonomous cultural field ( p. 56). However, as the book clearly shows, Argentine historians and intellectuals became inextricably linked to political and ideological struggles that limited that autonomy, an issue that Flavia Fiorucci has specifically explored in her works on intellectuals and Peronism. Also, while it may be generally correct that the chief common denominator of antiliberal nacionalismo in the 1930s was its opposition to the governments of the conservative restoration of 1932 - 43 ( p. 46), prominent conservative nacionalistas occupied positions in those governments, such as senators Matias Sanchez Sorondo and Benjamin Villafane and Buenos Aires's governor Manuel Fresco. Finally, the book's overall emphasis on revisionism leaves the liberal side with relatively less nuanced treatment. For example, in the 1930s and 1940s Socialists, Communists, Conservatives, liberal Catholics, and intellectuals subscribed to related yet different elements of the liberal tradition, an aspect noted briefly but that could have merited more analysis for these as well as later years. These observations notwithstanding, Goebel offers a well- written, theoretically sophisticated, and empirically grounded work. The creation by the Argentine government of a National Institute of Historical Revisionism in 2011 additionally shows the significant role of history in Argentine political and cultural debates as well as highlights the contemporary relevance of Goebel's work. Goebel offers a well- written, theoretically sophisticated, and empirically grounded work. The creation by the Argentine government of a National Institute of Historical Revisionism in 2011 additionally shows the significant role of history in Argentine political and cultural debates as well as highlights the contemporary relevance of Goebel's work. El nacionalismo y su relacion con la estabilidad politica han sido uno de los temas que mas ha desvelado a la historiografia argentina en los ultimos treinta anos. Michael Goebel recorre las relaciones entre nacionalismo y politicas de la historia en el siglo XX, donde el revisionism ocupa un lugar preponderante. En dialogo con la historiografia norteamericana, Goebel aporta una mirada alternativa, rechazando el "decadentismo" de quienes describen al nacionalismo como un fenomeno excepcional y responsable de los origenes del autoritarismo argentino. Propone analizarlo en el marco de los estudios generals sobre el fenomeno nacionalista, mostrando su pluralidad y complejidad. El primer capitulo trata del surgimiento del revisionismo historico, teniendo como antecedente un siglo XIX deficitario en el desarrollo de un campo historiografico profesional. En torno al Centenario (1910) recuerda la aparicion de un nacio nacionalismo etnico, que no revisaba las figuras del panteon liberal, pero cuyos postulados serian perennes en la politica local. En los treinta, el nacionalismo dio un nuevo giro, volcandose a un revisionismo historico centrado en la reivindicacion de la figura de Rosas, de perfil hispanista, antisemita, antiliberal y propulsor de un Estado jerarquico y autoritario. Los revisionistas crearon el instituto Juan Manuel de Rosas como una copia invertida de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, representante de la "historiografia liberal". A pesar de los enfrentamientos, ambas instituciones compartian el interes por los "grandes hombres" mas que por una revision de la metodologia de investigacion. El segundo capitulo cuestiona la identificacion entre el nacionalismo y el primer peronismo (1946-1955). Goebel reconoce puntos de contacto entre ambos, pero senala la aversion que Peron sentia a participar en los debates historicos, la pobre insercion de los representantes del revisionism en su gobierno y el uso recurrente que hacia de figuras del "panteon liberal". El encuentro entre el revisionismo y el peronismo se dara en un contexto de ilegitimidad del sistema politico (1955-1966) y es el eje del tercer capitulo. Dado que la denominada Revolucion Libertadora (1955-1958) reivindico los valores liberalrepublicanos del siglo XIX, el peronismo se apropio de simbolos revisionistas como la tradicion caudillista en contra del sarmientismo imperante. El cuarto capitulo describe el apogee del revisionismo. Fue a mediados de los anos sesenta cuando sus nuevos representantes, ahora miembros de la "izquierda nacional", se convirtieron en best-sellers. Desplazando otras formas de interpretacion, el revisionismo alcanzaria su cenit durante el tercer gobierno peronista (1973-1976). Un triunfo parcial, teniendo en cuenta sus limitadas cuotas de poder circunscriptas al ambito de la cultura, sin una verdadera influencia politica. El ultimo capitulo es un punto de llegada argumentativa. Goebel se pregunta sobre la relevancia del nacionalismo y del revisionismo en la legitimacion del Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional (1976-1983). Desde su perspectiva, la retorica regeneracionista de las Fuerzas Armadas en 1976 parece abonar la idea de que se trato del producto de la tradicion nacionalista, una cruzada de los "verdaderos salvadores" de la Argentina en contra de los "politicos". De hecho, un buen numero de nacionalistas catolicos participo del gobierno. Sin embargo, la prensa liberal tambien defendio al gobierno militar en nombre de la democracia y la civilizacion, asi como la retorica de la Junta de Comandantes se baso en la idea de pluralismo, democracia y valores republicanos. Lo suyo era la restauracion del nacionalismo civico del siglo XIX y la defensa del Occidente cristiano, un antitotalitarismo que acompanaba a los EE.UU. y que se hubiera sentido disconforme con el antiimperialismo nacionalista. El irredentismo que acompano la Guerra de Malvinas (1982) no tuvo tanto que ver con el chauvinism de los revisionistas, sino con decadas de ensenanza patriotica proveniente del nacionalismo del Centenario. La etapa democratica abierta en 1983 parece haber ahuyentado las apelaciones al pasado como mecanismo de legitimacion politica. Tanto Alfonsin como Menem tuvieron el suficiente respaldo electoral como para eludir un uso instrumental de lo historico. Menem, al repatriar los restos de Rosas, de alguna manera lo incorporo al panteon nacional, e hizo dificil su uso como arma politica. El revisionismo se redujo entonces a una de las versiones oficiales de la historia. La movilizacion de esos recursos volveria a ser posible durante los gobiernos de Nestor y Cristina Kirchner. Para Goebel el nacionalismo fue una matriz originada a fines del XIX por las ansiedades que la inmigracion genero en la elite dirigente. Los revisionistas tomaron elementos de esa matriz, combinandolos con una critica al Estado moderno, afirmando la distincion entre Estado y sociedad. Sin embargo, la influencia asignada a los movimientos nacionalistas y sus intelectuales ha sido desproporcionada con su pobre poder politico e institucional. Si bien muchas de sus ideas parecen haber inspirado los golpes de estado, la mayoria se disolvio rapidamente, chocando con la logica administrativa del Estado. Goebel's book is a serious and successful attempt to see the debates between contrasting nationalist narratives not just as mirrors but also as factors in the political development of a nation.