Reviews

From WWII meetings at Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam to the far-flung shuttle diplomacy that brought about German unification, Smyser (The German Economy, etc.) provides a masterful account of diplomatic detail that deserves broad recognition and acclaim. Anything but a dry history, it reflects the high stakes, uncertain distribution of forces and hidden landscapes of risk that forged the Cold War era, dominated by centuries-old concerns for security, self-determination and national honor among all the contending powers. The copious details concern nuances of maneuver, positioning and interpretation that make for compelling drama. Drawing on a full range of sourcesÄfrom diplomatic records, to personal recollections and his own interviewsÄSmyser provides an authoritative, remarkably engaging account. Its two weaknesses are the absence of any discussion of the persistence and resurgence of fascism in Germany, and an insider's insularity of focus and outlook. Smyser faithfully notes how leading figures who kept Berliners' (and all Germans') hopes aliveÄGeneral Lucius Clay during the Berlin airlift, JFK with his "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech, Willy Brandt with his Ost-PolitikÄdid so because their vision and instinct transcended the parameters of normal diplomatic thinking. Nevertheless, in the quality of its prose and the depth of its excavations into diplomatic and political activity, this is a valuable and exciting contribution. Maps, photos. Additional text on Kosovo not seen by PW. (Aug.) Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.

Smyser (The German Economy) sees Germany as the vortex of the Cold War, the most important consideration not only in European politics but in international relations generally for the last 45 years. Even seemingly remote issues such as the Cuban missile crisis are discussed in terms of the German question. Smyser spent many years working on German affairs in the State and Defense departments and has written extensively on the topic. This new title is based on both his work experience and his research in newly opened archives in the former East Germany and the former Soviet Union. He has reconstructed in meticulous detail the negotiations and posturings of the involved powers, attributing more mistakes to the Soviet Union than to the West. He ends with the reunification of Germany, on the optimistic note that the Germany of the 1990s is stronger and better positioned than at any time since Bismarck. Specialists will welcome this thorough and detailed analysis.ÄMarcia L. Sprules, Council on Foreign Relations Lib., New York Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.