Table of Contents

PART V: Constitutional Political Economy

A. On the Architecture of Governance

1. How Should Votes be Cast and Counted?
Nicolaus Tideman

2. Voters and representatives: How should representatives be selected?
Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer

3. Divided Government: the king and the council
George Tridimas

4. Bicameralism
Cecilia Testa

5. Federalism
Jaroslaw Kantorowicz

6. Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
Nicholas R. Miller

7. Politics and the Legal System
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal

8. Constitutional Review
Nuno Garoupa

9. Institutions for Amending Constitutions
Cristina Bucur and Bjørn Erik Rasch

10. Constitutional Transition
Zachary Elkins

11. Electoral systems in the making
Daniel Bochsler

12. Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
B?la Plechanovová, Madeleine O. Hosli and Anatolij Plechanov

B. The Theory of Dictatorship

13. Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
Martin C. McGuire

14. Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model after 40 Years
Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt

15. Are There Types of Dictatorship?
Ronald Wintrobe

16. Are there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governance
Alejandro Quiroz Flores

17. The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes
Toke Aidt and Gabriel Leon

18. The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
Timur Kuran and Diego Romero

C. On the Effects of the Institutions of Governance

19. Direct Democracy and Public Policy
John G. Matsusaka

20. Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems
Sebastian M. Saiegh

21. The Significance of Political Parties
Michael Munger

22. The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance
Georg Vanberg

23. Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
Stefan Voigt and Jerg Gutmann

PART VI: APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

A. The Politics of Public Policy

24. The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
Stanley L. Winer

25. The politics of central bank independence
Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger

26. The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
Luna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung

27. Political Participation and the welfare
Rainald Borck

28. Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
Paul Dragos Aligica and Michael E. Cox

29. Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
Ilya Somin

30. Is Government Growth Inevitable?
Randall G. Holcombe

B. International Public Choice

31. The Political Economy of International Organizations
Axel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang

32. The Politics of International Trade
Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman

33. Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets and the Shadow Economy: What do we (not) know?
Friedrich Schneider

34. The Politics of International Aid
Hristos Doucouliagos

35. Is democracy exportable?
Pierre Salmon

C. Public Choice and History

36. Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
Robert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen

37. Christian History and Public Choice
Mario Ferrero

38. Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
Keith L. Dougherty

39. Precursors to public choice
Iain McLean

D. Measurement and other Methodological Issues

40. Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole

41. The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
Keith T. Poole

42. Voting and Popularity
Gebhard Kirchgässner

43. Detection of election fraud
Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack

44. Experimental Public Choice: Elections
Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram

45. Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
Jean-Robert Tyran and Alexander K. Wagner

About the Author

Roger D. Congleton is the BB&T Professor of Economics at West Virginia University. He is coeditor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy , and has publishing well over a hundred fifty articles on public choice related topics in journals and academic books.
Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020.

Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine.

Stefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy.