1. Why I Am Not a Utilitarian
1.1 Utilitarianism: The good, the bad, and the ugly
1.2 The plan for the rest of the book
1.3 My aims
1.4 Objective oughts and objective reasons
1.5 Conventions that I will follow throughout the book
2. Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism
2.1 The too-demanding objection: How moral rationalism leads us to
reject utilitarianism
2.2 The argument against utilitarianism from moral rationalism
2.3 How moral rationalism compels us to accept consequentialism
2.4 What is consequentialism?
2.5 The presumptive case for moral rationalism
2.6 Some concluding remarks
3. The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons
3.1 Getting clear on what the view is
3.2 Clearing up some misconceptions about the view
3.3 Scanlon's putative counterexamples to the view
3.4 Arguments for the view
4. Consequentializing Commonsense Morality
4.1 How to consequentialize
4.2 The deontic equivalence thesis
4.3 Beyond the deontic equivalence thesis: How consequentialist
theories can do a better job of accounting for our considered moral
convictions than even some nonconsequentialist theories can
4.4 The implications of the deontic equivalence thesis
4.5 An objection
5. Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and
Overridingness
5.1 Some quick clarifications
5.2 Moral reasons, overridingness, and agent-centered options
5.3 Moral reasons, overridingness, and supererogation
5.4 A meta-criterion of rightness and how it leads us to adopt
dual-ranking act-consequentialism
5.5 Norcross's objection
5.6 Splawn's objection
5.7 Violations of the transitivity and independence axioms
6. Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options
6.1 Kagan's objection: Are we sacrificing rational options to get
moral options?
6.2 Imperfect reasons and rational options
6.3 Securitism
6.4 Securitism and the basic belief
6.5 Securitism's suppositions and implications
7. Commonsense Consequentialism
7.1 The best version of act-utilitarianism: commonsense
utilitarianism
7.2 Securitist consequentialism and the argument for it
7.3 Commonsense consequentialism and how it compares with
traditional act-consequentialism
7.4 What has been shown and what remains to be shown
Douglas W. Portmore is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University. His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he also writes on wellbeing, posthumous harm, and the nonidentity problem.
"It is well worth the reader's time to accompany Portmore on this
journey to the heart of consequentialism and back again: the
overall strategy is ingenious, and the arguments are as rigorous as
they are provocative. Both the debates within consequentialism and
those between consequentialists and their critics are advanced, and
Portmore provides the reader with a wealth of new philosophical
tools to advance them still further."--Paul Hurley, Notre Dame
Philosophical Reviews
"This is a really great book: an encompassing work of systematizing
moral philosophy in the classic style. Ambitious theorizing of this
scale and consequence is a rare treat in the contemporary
landscape, so Portmore's thorough development of a comprehensive
moral theory will serve as a model for much work to come. The view
outlined in these pages is repeatedly insightful and illuminating,
and forms a coherent package worthy of admiration. An important
contribution to the field."--Mark Schroeder, University of Southern
California
"The main contribution of the book is in arguing for a particular
account of the structure of practical reasons, the upshot of which
is a much more commonsensical account of consequentialism than is
standardly offered...In sum, this a very rich book, an important
contribution to the consequentialist literature, but more broadly,
an important contribution to our understanding of practical reason
in general." -- Mind
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