Warehouse Stock Clearance Sale

Grab a bargain today!


Modeling Bounded Rationality
By

Rating

Product Description
Product Details

Table of Contents

Part 1 Introduction: "modelling" and "bounded rationality"; the aim of this book; the state of the art; a personal note; bibliographic notes. Part 2 Bounded rationality in choice: the "rational man"; the traditional economist's position; the attack on the traditional approach; experimental evidence; comments; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 3 Modelling procedural decision making: motivation; preparing the tools - similarity relations; a procedure of choice between vectors; analysis; case-based theory; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 4 Modelling knowledge: knowledge and bounded rationality; information structure; the set-theoretical definition of knowledge; Kripke's model; the impact of the timing of decisions and having more information; on the possibility of speculative trade; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 5 Modelling limited memory: imperfect recall; an extensive decision making model with imperfect information; perfect and imperfect recall; time consistency; the role of randomization; the multiselves approach; on the problematics of using the model; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 6 Choosing what to know: optimal information structures; what is "high" and what is "low"?; manipulating informational restrictions; perceptrons; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 7 Modelling complexity in group decisions: introduction; the model of a team; processing information; aggregating preferences; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 8 Modelling bounded rationality in games: introduction; interaction between Luce players; a game with procedural rational players; limited foresight in extensive games; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 9 Complexity considerations in repeated games: introduction; the model of repeated games - a brief review; strategies as machines in infinitely repeated games; complexity considerations in repeated games; the structure of machine games equilibria; repeated extensive games; concluding remarks; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 10 Attempting to resolve the finite horizon paradoxes: motivation; implementation of strategies by machines; counting is costly; bounded capability to count; machines also send messages; the e-equilibrium approach - a deviation is costly; conclusion; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 11 Computability constraints in games: introduction; informal results on computability; is there a rational player?; Turing machine game; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 12 Final thoughts: Simon's critique; response.

About the Author

Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and New York University.

Ask a Question About this Product More...
 
This title is unavailable for purchase as none of our regular suppliers have stock available. If you are the publisher, author or distributor for this item, please visit this link.

Back to top