Part 1 Introduction: "modelling" and "bounded rationality"; the aim of this book; the state of the art; a personal note; bibliographic notes. Part 2 Bounded rationality in choice: the "rational man"; the traditional economist's position; the attack on the traditional approach; experimental evidence; comments; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 3 Modelling procedural decision making: motivation; preparing the tools - similarity relations; a procedure of choice between vectors; analysis; case-based theory; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 4 Modelling knowledge: knowledge and bounded rationality; information structure; the set-theoretical definition of knowledge; Kripke's model; the impact of the timing of decisions and having more information; on the possibility of speculative trade; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 5 Modelling limited memory: imperfect recall; an extensive decision making model with imperfect information; perfect and imperfect recall; time consistency; the role of randomization; the multiselves approach; on the problematics of using the model; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 6 Choosing what to know: optimal information structures; what is "high" and what is "low"?; manipulating informational restrictions; perceptrons; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 7 Modelling complexity in group decisions: introduction; the model of a team; processing information; aggregating preferences; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 8 Modelling bounded rationality in games: introduction; interaction between Luce players; a game with procedural rational players; limited foresight in extensive games; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 9 Complexity considerations in repeated games: introduction; the model of repeated games - a brief review; strategies as machines in infinitely repeated games; complexity considerations in repeated games; the structure of machine games equilibria; repeated extensive games; concluding remarks; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 10 Attempting to resolve the finite horizon paradoxes: motivation; implementation of strategies by machines; counting is costly; bounded capability to count; machines also send messages; the e-equilibrium approach - a deviation is costly; conclusion; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 11 Computability constraints in games: introduction; informal results on computability; is there a rational player?; Turing machine game; bibliographic notes; projects. Part 12 Final thoughts: Simon's critique; response.
Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and New York University.
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