Reviews

The war in Kosovo, Judah points out in his latest account of Balkan politics, didn't begin in 1999. A journalist covering the region for an array of Western publications (the Times of London, the New York Review of Books) throughout the 1990s, Judah (The Serbs) could see that Kosovo was on the brink of explosion--but until something tangible did erupt, his editors wouldn't print anything about it. In 1999, gruesome violence did erupt, culminating in NATO's 78-day bombing campaign. Now, having reported that conflict from the ground, Judah takes a step back to explore its roots in the events of the early 1980s and 1990s. Although not as strong as Noel Malcolm's 1998 book Kosovo: A Short History, Judah's work is an excellent addition to the literature about the Balkans. Drawing on both his firsthand experiences in the region and on secondary literature--and interspersing narrative history with journalistic accounts of warfare and fleeing refugees--he reflects on the longstanding local political struggles and the West's miscalculations. Along the way, he critically profiles Milosevic, NATO leaders (who thought this little war would last only a few days) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (whose own violent revenge began to sweep over Kosovo after the bombing ended). Well researched and melancholy, the book suggests that the bombing campaign was "a war of human error," in which "all the actors, in Serbia and in the West, just made mistake after mistake." This is an excellent introduction to the latest phase of Balkan warfare. (May) Copyright 2000 Cahners Business Information.

Timed to coincide with the first anniversary of the 1999 war in Kosovo, these works represent a worthy first draft of history. Freelance correspondent Judah explores the historical context underlying the Kosovo conflict and explains why NATO went to war in the misguided belief that a brief air campaign would force Slobodan Milosevic to buckle. He attributes the outbreak of war largely to human error on both sides: Serbian leaders refused to admit that their position in Kosovo was untenable, while the West sacrificed its credibility by repeatedly issuing empty threats of force and drastically underestimated the resolve of Belgrade to withstand a few days' bombardment. Ignatieff, a BBC commentator and eyewitness to the war, examines the troubling aspects of what he calls "virtual" war. Modern technology has made the West virtually unbeatable on the battlefield, while evolving notions of human rights have legitimized intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. Yet the detachment of Western citizens from recent wars, compounded by the widespread revulsion for casualties, dictated an ineffective military strategy in Kosovo. Allied aircraft delivered their munitions from 15,000 feet in order to prevent the loss of aircraft and crews. Thus, NATO military operations never addressed the political objectives justifying the war--notably, protecting Kosovar Albanians from Serb forces in the province. Ignatieff's thoughtful analysis helps explain why the West has seldom been able to back its lofty ideals with decisive force. Both works are strongly recommended for all libraries.--James R. Holmes, Ph.D. Candidate, Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, Belmont, MA, Copyright 2000 Cahners Business Information.