Table of Contents

Part I. The Puzzle of Electoral Clientelism: 1. Introduction; 2. Electoral clientelism in Kenya; 3. Theory: electoral clientelism as information; Part II. Empirical Evidence: 4. The mechanics of electoral clientelism: descriptive evidence; 5. Why is electoral clientelism effective? Experimental evidence; 6. Who invests in electoral clientelism? Incumbents versus challengers; 7. Electoral clientelism and ethnic politics; 8. Electoral clientelism and the provision of local public goods; 9. Conclusion.

Promotional Information

This book explains why vote buying is common in low-income democracies in Africa, and examines its consequences for democratic accountability.

About the Author

Eric Kramon is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, Washington, DC. His research on clientelism, elections, and distributive politics has been published in the British Journal of Political Science, the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, World Politics, and other journals, and has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the International Growth Centre, Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP), and the UK Department for International Development. Kramon received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles in 2013, and was a pre- and post-doctoral fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, California.