Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors ix

Introduction Jonathan Cohen xii

Part I Mental Content 1

Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3

1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5

2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 20

Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35

3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 37

4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 53

Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67

5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 69

6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 85

Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 103

7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 105

8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard G. Heck Jr 117

Part II Physicalism 139

Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141

9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism Louise Antony 143

10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 160

Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183

11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 185

12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 200

Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225

13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 227

14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 243

Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 265

Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267

15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 269

16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 287

Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301

17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 303

18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 319

Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333

19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 335

20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 358

Index 377

About the Author

Brian P. McLaughlin is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1988), editor of Dretske and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind.

Jonathan Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.

Reviews

"The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentious issues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape and identifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that is thoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone with an interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind." (Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011)

“McLaughlin and Cohen present a series of 10 debates dealing with the issues of mental content, physicalism, and the place of consciousness in nature. The introduction gives a useful overview of each debate and each has been given a heading making it clear what the central issue at stake is. This is a good collection that does what it promises and provides a good introduction to some important issues.” (Metapsychology, October 2008)