Table of Contents

1. 1. Introduction: Categories, dimensions, and the problem of progress in affective science (by Zachar, Peter); 2. 2. In defense of multiple Core Affects (by Panksepp, Jaak); 3. 3. From a psychological constructionist perspective (by Russell, James A.); 4. 4. "Nature proposes...and science disposes" tertiary vs primary process approaches to emotions and affects: Commentary on Jim Russell's position (by Panksepp, Jaak); 5. 5. Preliminary comments on Panksepp (by Russell, James A.); 6. 6. Discrete emotions: From folk psychology to causal mechanisms (by Scarantino, Andrea); 7. 7. Nothing in mammalian psychology makes sense except in light of primary-process affective capacities (by Davies, Paul Sheldon); 8. 8. Lessons for affective science from a metascience of 'molecular and cellular cognition' (by Bickle, John); 9. 9. Affect as appraisal (by Leddy, Meaghan A.); 10. 10. What should theories of emotion be about? (by Averill, James R.); 11. 11. Valence, reductionism, and the ineffable: Philosophical reflections on the Panksepp-Russell debate (by Sousa, Ronald de); 12. 12. Functional and empirical presuppositions in Russell and Panksepp: Neural predispositions of affect (by Northoff, Georg); 13. 13. Comparison of affect program theories, appraisal theories, and psychological construction theories (by Moors, Agnes); 14. 14. Final remarks (by Russell, James A.); 15. 15. My reflections on commentaries and concluding perspectives (by Panksepp, Jaak); 16. 16. Concluding observations: Comparisons, contrasts, and some important convergences (by Ellis, Ralph D.); 17. Index